

5 DECEMBER 1946

I N D E X
Of
WITNESSES
(none)

I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
2685	1331		Regulations of the Sixth Committee Approved by the Prime Minister 2 December 1941 - Amended 23 January 1942		11944
1492	1332		Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Area dated 12 December 1941		11948
1112	1333		A draft marked "Foreign Ministry Top Secret" and entitled: "Policy Towards Neutral Powers and other Problems"	11959	
1112A	1333A		Excerpt therefrom entitled: "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea Area" dated 14 December 1941		11960
1987B	1334		The Fundamental Principles of the Remedial Measures for Southern Regions to be occupied as a result of the Great East Asia War (Excerpt from prosecution's document marked exhibit No. 679 for identification)		11968

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1621C	1335		Establishment of East Asia Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War (Ex- cerpt from exhibit No. 689 marked for identification)		11974
2402B	1336		Draft of Basic Plan for Estab- lishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere dated 27 January /SPONA 17/ 1942		12010
1555M	1337		Concerning the Opening of Hostilities Against Nether- lands Forces - Statement of the Government Issued by the Board of Information on 12 January 1942 (An excerpt from exhibit No. 879 for identifi- cation)		12025
1038	1338		Minister of State Shigenori TOGO's Speech 22 January 1942	12027	
1038A	1338A		Excerpt therefrom		12027
1038B	1338B		Minister of State Hideki TOJO's Speech dated 22 January 1942		12034
2624A	1339		A sworn statement of Major G.L. Reinderheff, Royal Netherlands Indies Army		12043

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2618	1340		A Sworn Statement dated 20 May 1946 by Colonel C. van den Hoogenbend, Royal Netherlands Indies Army		12047
2620A	1341		A Sworn Statement dated 10 April 1946 by J. T. van Amstel (Militia Sailor)		12049
2622A	1342		A Sworn Statement dated 22 June 1946 by Lieutenant A.F.P. Hulsewe, Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve		12054
2674	1343		ATIS Report dated 11 August 1943 Containing an Account of the Netherlands Indies Operations (captured enemy document)	12060	
2674A	1343A		Excerpt therefrom		12061
2754	1344		Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War		12068
2339	1345		The Japan Year Book 1943-1944 (pp. 200 and 202)		12096
2339C	1346		Excerpt from the above (pp. 1049 to 1051) The Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations - Joint Declaration Adopted on 6 November 1943		12098

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468	1347		Address of His Excellency General Hideki TOJO, representative of Japan, dated 5 November 1943	12103	
468A	1347A		Excerpt therefrom		12103
2755	1348		Policy in Regard to the Independence of the East Indies		12110
2758	1349		Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence, Data for Foreign Minister's Explanation, 17 July 1945		12116
2759	1350		Decision of the Supreme War Plans Council No. 27, 17 July 1945, re Measures for the East Indies Independ- ence		12120

1 Thursday, 5 December, 1946

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4
5 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
6 FOR THE FAR EAST
7 Court House of the Tribunal
8 War Ministry Building
9 Tokyo, Japan

10 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
11 at 0930.

12 - - -

13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 The Accused:

18 All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is
19 represented by his counsel.

20 - - -

21 (English to Japanese and Japanese
22 to English interpretation was made by the
23 Language Section, INTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Major Moore:

4 LANGUAGE ARBITER: (Major Moore): Mr. Presi-
5 dent, with the Tribunal's permission, I present the
6 following language corrections: Exhibit 1281, record
7 page 11,385, line 1, delete quotation marks. Page
8 11,386, line 12, delete quotation marks. Line 13,
9 delete "KOISO." Line 14, delete "Has decided that."

10 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Major.

11 MR. JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: The
12 Tribunal's attention is respectfully invited to
13 Exhibit No. 588, containing the resolution adopted
14 by the Imperial Conference of 1 December, 1941. Although
15 this resolution has been read previously, on page
16 10,519, of the record, it now appears that the English
17 translation, then quoted, was not correct. The Lan-
18 guage Arbitration Board have been notified of this
19 and have approved the corrections suggested by the
20 Prosecution. With the Tribunal's permission we will
21 now quote the corrected text of the resolution
22 adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941.
23 I read: "Our negotiations with the United States
24 regarding the execution of our national policy,
25

1 adopted on November 5th, have finally failed. Japan
2 will open hostilities against the United States.
3 Britain and the Netherlands."

4 The Tribunal's attention is respectfully
5 invited to exhibit 1214, being an intercepted tele-
6 gram from Tokyo to Asinking, dated 4 December 1941,
7 in which it is stated that although Manchukuo will
8 not directly participate in the war, Britain, the
9 United States and the Netherlands will be regarded
10 as de facto enemies by the Government of Manchukuo.

11 The Tribunal's attention is invited to
12 exhibit 1241, being the minutes of the meeting of
13 the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council,
14 concerning the declaration of war against America
15 and England on December 8th, 1941. More particularly,
16 we wish to draw the Tribunal's attention to the
17 statement by the accused TOJO, on Page 2 of the
18 English text, wherein, answering the question
19 whether or not war will be declared on the Nether-
20 lands, he states, that this will be omitted in view
21 of future strategic convenience.

22 The Tribunal's attention is invited to the
23 fact that by its order in Paper No. 574, it has
24 taken judicial notice of the fact that on December
25 8th, 1941, the Government of the Kingdom of the

1 Netherlands declared a state of war to exist
2 between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
3 Japanese empire.

4 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I think
5 that should be made to read "the Government of Nether-
6 lands in exile."

7 THE PRESIDENT: It is for you to prove
8 where it is and what its location amounts to, Mr.
9 Logan.

10 Mr. Cunningham.

11 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Mr. President, if the
12 Court is to take judicial notice of the fact, it
13 occurs to me that it should be a fact upon which
14 there is no contest.

15 THE PRESIDENT: So judicial notice is just
16 what the defense allows the Court to notice. I am
17 afraid we won't find any profit in a continuation of
18 this discussion, Mr. Cunningham.

19 MR. JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: If the Tri-
20 bunal please, Mr. Laverge will present the next
21 documents in evidence.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Laverge.

23 MR. LAVERGE: At the end of November, 1941,
24 a new Cabinet Committee had been established under
25 the Chairmanship of the President of the Planning

1 Board, the accused SUZUKI, which was to draw up
2 plans for the economic exploitation of the Southern
3 Areas. This is shown in prosecution document No.
4 2685, which we now offer in evidence.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 2685 will be given exhibit No. 1331.

8 (Whereupon, the document above re-
9 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
10 No. 1331 and received in evidence.)

11 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read exhibit 1331:

12 "Regulations of the Sixth Committee. Ap-
13 proved by the Prime Minister December 2nd, 1941,
14 amended January 23rd, 1942.

15 "Article I. The Sixth Committee shall be es-
16 tablished in the Cabinet for the purpose of dis-
17 cussing and drafting matters concerning economic
18 plans and control centering around the acquisition
19 and development of the resources in the Southern
20 areas (French Indo-China, Thailand and other Southern
21 areas.)

22 "Article II. It shall consist of a chairman
23 and five committeemen. It may appoint temporary
24 committeemen if deemed temporarily necessary.

25 "Article III. The president of the Planning

1 Board shall be its chairman.

2 "Article IV. Committeemen and temporary Com-
3 mitteemen shall be appointed or requested by the
4 Prime Minister from among the higher civil service
5 officials of the Planning Board and other government
6 offices concerned.

7 "Article V. The Chairman shall preside over the
8 business of the Committee.

9 "Article VI. The Committee shall have a chief
10 secretary and secretaries. It may also appoint tem-
11 porary secretaries if deemed temporarily necessary.
12 The vice-president of the Planning Board shall be
13 the chief secretary and he shall manage the business
14 of the committee under the direction of the Chairman
15 of the Committee.

16 "Secretaries and temporary secretaries shall
17 be appointed or requested by the Prime Minister
18 from among the higher civil service officials of
19 the Planning Board and other government offices con-
20 cerned. They shall handle the business of the
21 Committee under the direction of superior officials.

22 "Article VII. The general affairs of the com-
23 mittee shall be handled by the Planning Board.

24 "Article VIII. The establishment of the com-
25 mittee and other matters pertaining to it shall be

1 kept secret.

2 "Matters Pertaining to the Establishment of
3 the Sixth Committee Decided at the Cabinet Con-
4 ference November 28, 1941.

5 "The Sixth Committee, organized with the per-
6 sonnel of the government offices concerned (the
7 Planning Board, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance
8 Ministry, the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry)
9 shall be established in the Cabinet for the purpose
10 of discussing and drafting matters pertaining to
11 the economic plans and control centering around the
12 acquisition and development of the resources in the
13 Southern Areas (French Indo-China, Thailand and
14 other southern areas.)

15 "The general affairs of this committee shall be
16 handled by the Planning Board.

17 "Accompanying the establishment of this com-
18 mittee, the Fifth Committee of the Planning Board
19 shall be abolished.

20 "EXPLANATION

21 "The reason is that although economic problems
22 pertaining to the Southern Areas hereto have been
23 disposed of by the Fifth Committee of the Planning
24 Board, it has become necessary in order to cope with
25 the present situation and carry out the economic

1 plans and control centering around the acquisition
2 and development of the resources in the Southern
3 Areas (French Indo-China, Thailand and other
4 southern areas) through a controlled activation of
5 the composite national power under a united political
6 and strategical policy and thereby contribute to-
7 ward the establishment of our powerful national de-
8 fense state, to set up in the Cabinet a committee
9 to discuss and draft matters pertaining to this in
10 particular.

11 "Accompanying the establishment of this com-
12 mittee, the Fifth Committee of the Planning Board
13 is abolished."

14 The first report by the newly established
15 Sixth Committee was dated 12 December 1941 and gave
16 full details concerning the economic measures to
17 be taken in the Netherlands Indies and the other
18 Southern Areas after the occupation. As will be
19 shown later, the economic measures taken by Japan
20 in the Netherlands Indies after their occupation,
21 closely followed the program worked out in this
22 report.

23 We now offer this report, prosecution document
24 1492, in evidence.
25

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 no. 1492 will receive exhibit No. 1332.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-
4 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5 No. 1332 and received in evidence.)

6 MR. LAVELLE: We shall read parts of
7 exhibit 1332, starting at the top of page 1:

8 "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the
9 Southern Area.

10 "Top Secret. 12 Dec. 1941. The Government and
11 Supreme Command Liaison Committee Report. 16 Dec.
12 1941. Cabinet Meeting Report. Top Secret. Chief
13 Official. Commerce and Industry Ministry.

14 "The Sixth Committee. Contents.

15 "Chapter I. Policy.

16 "Chapter II. The essentials of the Counter-Plan
17 for Area A.

18 "The First Counter-Plan.

19 "The Second Counter-Plan.

20 "Chapter III. The essentials of the Counter-
21 Plan for Area B.

22 "Chapter I. Policy.

23 "I. The principal aim of the policy is to fill
24 the demand for important natural resources and there-
25 by contribute to the execution of the present warfare,

and, at the same time, to establish a system of
1 autarchy for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
2 Sphere, and speedily find means of strengthening
3 and regleting the Imperial economic strength.

4 "II. The areas which become the object of this
5 counter-plan shall be: the Dutch East Indies,
6 British Malaya and Borneo, Philippines (the above
7 shall be Area A); French Indo-China and Thailand
8 (the above shall be Area B.)

9 "III. In regard to Area A, the measures shall
10 be divided into two: the first counter-plan and
11 the second counter-plan. Each shall be based on
12 the following policy.

13 "1. The First Counter-plan.

14 "(a) The emphasis shall be laid on the ac-
15 quisition of natural resources, and in the execu-
16 tion of these measures, the securing of necessary
17 resources for carrying out the war shall be the
18 main objective.

19 "(b) Every means shall be adopted to prevent
20 outflow of special resources of the Southern areas
21 to enemy countries.

22 "(c) In the acquisition of resources, emphasis
23 shall be laid so that existing enterprises can be
24 profitably led to cooperation and that efforts shall
25

1 be made to lighten to the minimum the burdens on
2 our Imperial economic strength.

3 "2. The Second Counter-plan.

4 "The completion of an autarchy system in the
5 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be the
6 objective, and permanent arrangements for it shall
7 be made.

8 "IV. In regard to Area B, steps will be taken
9 to produce promptly effective measures based upon
10 our pre-arranged policy, and with the utilization
11 of our prestige /coercive power/, which shall be in-
12 creased as a result of the development of situations
13 in Area A, measures shall be adopted to realize our
14 demands for important resources; especially in the
15 securing of food resources, and others. Furthermore,
16 should the situation change suddenly, another policy
17 shall be decided."

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1 "Chapter II

2 "The Essentials of the Counter-Plan for Area A.

3 "The First Counter-Plan.

4 "I. General Rules.

5 "1. All acquired or exploited materials shall
6 be included in the material mobilization plan.

7 "At the beginning of a military operation,
8 all existent important materials shall be collected
9 and secured in accordance with the decisions of our
10 Army and Navy. In regard to the disposal of the afore-
11 mentioned materials, it shall be in accordance with
12 the preceding clause.

13 "2. The order for exploiting materials shall
14 be decided by the Central authorities after consider-
15 ation is given to the changes in war situations and
16 the degree of necessity for resources.

17 "3. The standard for the acquisition of
18 resources for the fiscal year of 1942, and the esti-
19 mated acquisition for the fiscal year of 1944 are as
20 indicated in attached sheet No. 1 and No. 2.

21 "4. Personnel funds (paid out of the budget
22 at present), materials, etc. necessary for the develop-
23 ment of local petroleum and other mineral resources
24 shall be allotted, for the time being, to the Army and
25 Navy."

1 "5. Deficient resources of each district shall
2 be supplied as follows:

3 "a. Self-sufficiency shall be planned as much
4 as possible for necessities of life.

5 "b. Mutual interchange of products between
6 Southern areas shall be made as much as possible.

7 "c. Japan shall be relied upon only for such
8 materials as cannot be found.

9 "6. Mutual interchange of southern products
10 based on the above clauses shall be made in accordance
11 with negotiations carried on between the Army and
12 Navy authorities in the area and at home, and that
13 under government regulation.

14 "II. Development.

15 "1. Petroleum.

16 "(1) Development of resources shall be
17 concentrated on petroleum. Priority for procurement
18 of funds, materials, and all other measures which are
19 necessary shall be provided.

20 "(2) At the outset the petroleum industry
21 shall be managed by the armed forces and as soon as
22 conditions permit, it shall be speedily transferred
23 to private enterprise.

24 "(3) Considerin the difficulties in ac-
25 quisition and transportation, appropriate areas shall

1 be developed, and efforts shall be directed especially
2 toward the acquisition of suitable oil for aviation
3 gasoline.

4 "(4) In regard to local refining of oil,
5 needed facilities shall be restored proportionate to
6 the conditions of the existing facilities and upon
7 reference to Japanese and Manchurian productive capacity.

8 "2. Other Mineral Resources.

9 "(1) In the mining industry, the exploita-
10 tive power shall be concentrated on key points, and
11 the principal aim is to exploit the maximum quantity
12 of resources by minimum number of enterprises with
13 excellent efficiency.

14 "(a) Facilities as of current operating
15 conditions, shall be restored as speedily as possible,
16 and a step forward shall be taken to promote exploita-
17 tive enterprises in new areas, for instance: nickel
18 ore, copper ore, bauxite, chromium ore, manganese ore,
19 mica, phosphate rock or other ores for special steel,
20 and non-ferrous metal (tin excepted).

21 "(b) Those exploitative enterprises in new
22 areas that are to be temporarily suspended shall be:
23 Tin ore and Iron ore.

24 "2. The selection of entrepreneurs to take
25 charge of new exploitation of important mineral

1 resources shall be, for the most part, in principle,
2 in accordance with the purport of the following items.

3 "(a) That the exploitation of resources in
4 one place shall be left as much as possible solely to
5 one entrepreneur.

6 "(b) That the entrepreneur must possess
7 excellent and sound experience in this type of industry
8 in the area concerned or elsewhere.

9 "(c) That the entrepreneur must possess
10 ability necessary in the exploitation of resources.

11 "(d) Throughout the Southern area, the same
12 variety of resources shall be divided and shared by
13 two or more entrepreneurs, so as to avoid the evil of
14 having one firm monopolize one variety. Special
15 resources, however, are not restricted to this rule.

16 "3. Agriculture, forestry and marine products
17 industry.

18 "1. In agriculture, forestry and marine
19 products enterprises, the advance of new Japanese
20 entrepreneurs shall be checked for the present,
21 except in some urgently necessary cases.

22 "2. Each region should endeavor to attain
23 self-sufficiency in most of its food resources.

24 "4. Manufacturing Industry.

25 "Manufacturing industries shall not be set

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1 up in the area as a rule, except special ones (e.g.
2 shipbuilding, repair shops for equipment for natural
3 resource development). This rule is not applicable
4 to industry having equipment already in the area,
5 and can contribute to reduction of the shipping
6 load.

7 "III. Currency.

8 "Although we should endeavor to make the
9 best use of the local currency,

10 "1. at first,

11 "(a) we shall use military currency,
12 which is to be expressed in the local currency of
13 each area.

14 "(b) Military currency shall circulate
15 on a par with local currency. Compulsory measures
16 shall be adopted for that purpose.

17 "(c) Both at home and in the area a
18 well organized structure should be considered for
19 managing military currency.

20 "(d) Any expenses required for acquiring
21 and developing principle natural resources in the area
22 shall be drawn from the war budget at present.

23 "2. In accordance with the steps of
24 controlling the occupied areas.

25 "(a) We should endeavor to control its local

1 system of currency issue as far as possible, and to
2 adjust its function with the military currency system
3 in order to advance gradually towards a unification
4 of both. In line with this, the already issued
5 military currency should be withdrawn in exchange for
6 the local currency.

7 "(b) The liquidation as a result of the
8 unification or withdrawal mentioned above shall be
9 carried out as follows:

10 "1. To use means such as borrowing money from,
11 and floating loans through, the note-issuing banks.

12 ". To appropriate confiscated enemy property.

13 "3. To order local governments or public
14 corporations to bear a share of the national defence
15 expenditure.

16 "(c) Measures to raise funds for acquiring
17 and developing principal natural resources shall be
18 decided later on.

19 "3. Exchange control in the area should
20 be completely organized to control movement of funds."

21 We shall now read paragraph V on page 7:

22 "V. Transportation.

23 "1. Freight space available for transporta-
24 tion to and from Southern areas shall be allotted each
25 month to the Army and Navy."

1 "2. Requisitioned space shall be used for
2 transportation of natural resources.

3 "3. Ships of more than 500 tons, seized in
4 the area, shall be transferred to the central author-
5 ities for disposal, but ships under 500 tons shall be
6 used in the area under the direction of the central
7 authorities.

8 "4. The order and quantity of shipping of
9 southern area resources requiring shipping shall be
10 decided according to their importance."

11 We shall pass over paragraph 6 and continue
12 reading paragraph 7, from the bottom of page 7 onwards:

13 "VII. Economic pressure on the U. S. and
14 Britain.

15 "Natural resources, which are expected to be
16 useful in economic warfare with America and Britain,
17 are as follows:

18 "Rubber, tin, petroleum, quinine, tungsten,
19 Manila hemp, copra, palm oil.

20 "VIII. Self-sufficiency of the Army and Navy
21 in the area.

22 "1. Local goods for self-sufficiency of the
23 armed forces should be decided according to the needs
24 of the military operations, and are expected to con-
25 tain mainly the following items:

1 "(1) Provisions and forage (this item should
2 use collections of local goods as far as possible).

3 "(2) Fuel.

4 "(3) Some clothing and building material.
5 Those important materials such as petroleum should
6 be, of course, used most sparingly and within the limit
7 allotted by the central military authorities according
8 to the material mobilization plan.

9 "2. In case manufacturing industry is needed
10 for self-sufficiency of the armed forces in the area,
11 it should be limited to the use of existing equipment
12 under military management.

13 "The Second Counter Plan.

14 "These counter-plans should aim at the com-
15 pletion of a system of autarchy in the Greater East Asia
16 Co-Prosperity Sphere, aid the economic development of
17 the Japanese people in the Southern area on a nation-
18 ally-planned basis, and promote economic exchange
19 between areas within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The
20 details of this counter-plan will be decided upon at
21 another time.

22 "Chapter III

23 "The Counter-plan for Area B.

24 "These counter-plans should be mainly based
25 on the policies determined by the Fifth Committee. If

1 the situation requires their revision, they will be
2 decided upon at another time.

3 "In regard to marine transportation, regula-
4 tions shall conform to those of Area A."

5 "We shall not read the two attached charts,
6 showing the development of production in the Southern
7 Areas as planned by the Committee, although the
8 Tribunal might wish to consider them.

9 We offer for identification only, prosecu-
10 tion document 1112, a draft marked "Foreign Ministry
11 Top Secret" and entitled "Policy Towards Neutral
12 Powers and other Problems."

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
14 No. 1112 will receive exhibit No. 1333 for identifica-
15 tion only.

16 (Whereupon, the document above referred
17 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1333 for
18 identification.)

19 MR. LAVERGE: An excerpt from this document
20 entitled "Summarized Plan for Management of the South
21 Sea Area," dated 14 December 1941, is now offered in
22 evidence.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 No. 1112A will receive exhibit No. 1333A.

1 (Whereupon, the document above referred
2 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1333A
3 and received in evidence.)
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MR. LAVERGE: We shall read exhibit 1333A:
"SUMMARIZED PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTH
SEA AREA.

"December 14 SHOWA 16/1941/

"1. The purpose and basic policy.

"Our purpose is to guarantee the security of the
Empire and establish the organization necessary for
projecting the construction of Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere in which the Empire is the
leading power.

"The following are the basic policies of a
concrete plan for this purpose:

"a. Acquisition and utilization of military bases,
the rights to station troops (including naval forces),
cooperative defense - these military demands indis-
pensable for the national defense of the Empire and
the safe-guarding of East Asia must be secured.

"b. To secure the demands for acquisition of the
resources for national defense, such as, petrol, tin
and rubber.

"Securing the demand for tightening of economic
cooperation in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.

"c. Severing the political shackles of Europe
and America in the South Sea Area, concurrently

1 respecting to the utmost the desire of the southern
2 people for emancipation and independence, but the
3 procedure such as incorporation of any region into
4 the Imperial territory or establishment of a protect-
5 orate must be resolutely carried out when that is con-
6 sidered proper from the standpoint of the absolute
7 necessity for the national defense of the Empire, the
8 degree of stupidity of the natives and other conditions.

9 "2. Summarized plan for management of the
10 Philippines.

11 "a. The Philippines shall quickly become
12 independent.

13 "b. Make them promise to offer the use of mili-
14 tary bases and the other necessary military co-
15 operation to Japan

16 "c. Make an agreement of the close diplo-
17 matic collaboration with the Empire.

18 "d. Make them promise a close economic col-
19 laboration with the Empire.

20 "3. Summarized plan of Treatment of Dutch
21 Indies.

22 "a. Make the Dutch Indies independent as
23 'The Indonesian Federation.'

24 "b. Make them promise the establishment of
25 Japanese military bases."

1 "Make them promise to co-operate with Japan
2 on other points, also.

3 "With regard to their diplomatic policies,
4 make them promise to act hand-in-hand with Japan.
5 Concerning their military diplomacy, Japan shall par-
6 ticipate in their doings. The method of participation
7 shall be decided separately.

8 "c. Make them promise a close economic col-
9 laboration with Japan in the development and utiliza-
10 tion of their natural resources, etc.

11 "d. Make States of the following three dis-
12 tricts, which are capable of constructing self-
13 government, and make a federation of the States:
14 Java (including Madura, Bali and Lombok); Sumatra;
15 Celebes (excluding Tiror, Bali and Lombok, and includ-
16 ing the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Molucca Islands).

17 "e. The following districts which are at pre-
18 sent incapable of self-government, shall be made do-
19 minions of the Federal States, but their control shall
20 be entrusted to Japan; Dutch Borneo, Dutch New Guinea,
21 Dutch Tiror.

22 "f. Owing to military and transportation re-
23 quirements, the Nicou and Lingga Islands in the Singa-
24 pore Straits, and the Anambas and Natuna Islands in
25 the Borneo Straits shall be organized as Japanese ter-

1 ritery and a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore
2 shall administrate them.

3 "4. Summarized Plan of treatment of British
4 Malaya.

5 "a. Singapore and the other Straits Settle-
6 ments.

7 "1. They shall be organized as Japanese ter-
8 ritery and a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore
9 shall administrate them. However, for geographical
10 reasons Lisbuan Island shall be organized as a part of
11 Borneo, which is under the direct control of Japan for
12 administration.

13 "b. The Federated States and the non-Federated
14 States of Malaya.

15 "1. As a rule, make all of the States pro-
16 tectorates of Japan and recognize them as kingdoms as
17 has been generally the situation in the past.

18 "2. Make the present Federation dismember
19 itself and organize a new federation chiefly consisting
20 of the former Federated and non-Federated States.

21 "3. Establish Japan's right of protectorate
22 over the Federation as well as its component states by
23 a treaty of protection, and have a Japanese Governor-
24 General resident in Singapore to direct them and con-
25 trol their administration. "

1 "4. The kingdom of Brunei, one of the former
2 nor-Federated States, is not to be included in the Malay
3 Federation, but is to be made a separate Japanese pro-
4 tectorate because of its location in Borneo.

5 "5. The treatment of the States of Perlis,
6 Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, which are regions lost
7 by Thailand /Siam/, shall be considered separately.

8 "5. Summary plan of the treatment of British
9 North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.

10 "a. British North Borneo shall be organized
11 as the Japanese territory and shall be governed by a
12 Japanese Governor-General in Singapore.

13 "b. Sarawak, abolishing its English monarchy,
14 shall be organized as Japanese territory and shall be
15 governed by a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore.

16 "c. Make Brunei a Japanese protectorate and
17 recognize it as a kingdom, generally the same position
18 it had before. Establish the Japanese right of pro-
19 tectorate by a treaty of protection, and have a Japanese
20 Governor-General resident in Singapore direct and con-
21 trol its administration.

22 "6. Summary plan of the disposition of Hongkong.

23 "a. Reversion of Hongkong shall be decided
24 contingent upon the settlement of the China Incident.

25 "Note: The management of the areas not men-

1 tioned in the above plan shall be considered separately
2 when necessary according to the changes of the situation
3 hereafter."

1 MR. LAVERGE: We next offer in evidence
2 prosecution's document 1987-B, an excerpt from
3 prosecution's document 1987, hithertofore marked
4 exhibit 679 for identification. The proffered
5 excerpt consists of parts of copies of two plans
6 dealing with the final disposal of the Japanese
7 conquests, the originals of which plans the witness
8 Kazuo, YATSUCI on 9 October, 1946 testified he
9 obtained from the Research Section of the Japanese
10 War Ministry in February or March 1942.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

12 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, I want to object
13 on this document's introduction in evidence because
14 of the nature of the document, being that of one of
15 the Research Institute plans. That was where the
16 students took the part of various Cabinet members
17 and ministers, if the Court will recall the testimony
18 just referred to by the prosecution. The plans, as
19 set out, were hypothetical cases for the purpose of
20 study. If the Court should recall, in the record,
21 from the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses,
22 these plans -- they testified to under cross-examin-
23 ation -- were never used, and were never referred to,
24 and in none of the other documents have they been
25 referred to in any of the official plans that they

1 used any research plans. Therefore, the defense
2 feels it would be without probative value and would
3 be immaterial and irrelevant to be entered in
4 evidence in this phase of the case.

5 MR. LAVERGE: Your Honor, I am afraid that
6 learned counsel for the defense is not quite correct
7 in his statements here. Prosecution's document
8 1987 consists of three parts. The third part is
9 a study by this National Policy Research Institute
10 which was a private institute. The first two parts
11 are copies of documents which the Institute borrowed
12 from the War Ministry. What we introduced in
13 evidence here are only excerpts from the first two
14 parts, excerpts from documents which originally
15 were in the files of the War Ministry.

16 THE PRESIDENT: The documents as tendered
17 are admitted on the usual terms.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
19 No. 1987-B will receive exhibit No. 1334.

20 (Whereupon, the document above re-
21 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 1334 and received in evidence.)

23 MR. BROOKS: I want to call to the Court's
24 attention there is no certificate attached, and I
25 am instructed under the proceedings it was connected

1 up to this witness that he did identify it, and
2 we would like to reserve our chance to object to
3 that under the Court's ruling.

4 MR. LAVERGE: We will now read passages
5 from exhibit 1234, starting at the top of page 1.

6 "THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REMEDIAL
7 MEASURES FOR SOUTHERN REGIONS TO BE OCCUPIED AS A
8 RESULT OF THE GREAT EAST ASIA WAR."

9 THE PRESIDENT: Where is that certificate,
10 Mr. Laverge?

11 MR. LAVERGE: Your Honor, there is no
12 certificate because this document, when it was
13 originally introduced, was certified by a live
14 witness who testified that these were the documents
15 which he personally borrowed from the files of the
16 War Ministry.

17 THE PRESIDENT: That is sufficient.

18 MR. LAVERGE: That is on page 7368 of the
19 record.

20 I continue reading:

21 "No. 1. POLICY.

22 "Then Japan completely occupies the southern
23 regions belonging to the United States, Great Britain,
24 and the Netherlands as a result of the present Great
25 East Asia War, Japan will be in a position to decide

1 "all matters concerning the type of sovereignty,
2 politics, culture, and economy for these regions
3 according to her own desire. However, as it is
4 seen in the Imperial Proclamation of the Declaration
5 of War, the aspirations of the present war are to
6 extel the Anglo-American domination in the Orient
7 in order to ensure Japan's existence, and also to
8 establish the Greater Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere
9 in order to secure the stability of East Asia so
10 that it may contribute to the peace of the world.
11 Therefore, the remedial measures touching those
12 regions should be conducted entirely in accordance
13 with the purport of the Rescript.

14 "No. 2 THE MAIN POINTS.

15
16 "1. When we occupy the southern regions belong-
17 ing to the United States, Great Britain, and the
18 Netherlands, the influences of those countries shall
19 be expelled.

20 "2. There shall be established in these occupied
21 regions special agents to be in charge of matters
22 concerning politics, culture, and economy so that
23 we may set up an all-round plan as soon as possible
24 in order to establish the Greater Asiatic Co-Prosp-
25 erity Sphere which is the aim of the present holy
war."

1 "3. In order to ensure the existence of the
2 Japanese Empire and that a national defence state
3 of high degree be built up, the development of the
4 available natural resources of those various regions
5 by their inhabitants under our leadership is a
6 thing to be obtained. The bringing about of the
7 development of such natural resources mentioned
8 above is also of vital necessity for promotion of
9 the well-being of those peoples within the regions,
10 but, taking into consideration the relation of
11 demand and supply of the resources of the East Asia
12 Co-Prosperity Sphere, plans must quickly be made both
13 for an industrial reorganization of the whole Co-
14 Prosperity Sphere, and also, in particular, a counter-
15 plan is necessary for a cut in production of such
16 natural resources as are considered to be over-
17 production to the demand of the Co-Prosperity Sphere,
18 (rubber, tin, sugar, etc.) taking into consideration
19 the living conditions of the inhabitants and the
20 industrial economy of the given areas.

21 "4. After peace and order becomes secured, all
22 occupied regions, with exception of those sections
23 spotted to be military operational bases specially
24 under our direct control in the future, shall be so
25 liberated as to have the natives restore their

1 independence with some properly divided area as a
2 unit in accordance with the ability of the natives
3 residing in each area, provided that the independent
4 unit does not necessarily have to be on 'one race for
5 one nation' basis.

6 "5. The areas to be independent shall be
7 monarchies according to various situations; and
8 in case of necessity these monarchies shall be
9 organized as coalition monarchies.

10 "6. Although self-government for internal
11 affairs will be gradually granted to each country
12 which has achieved its independence, Japan shall
13 exercise control, through some special organization
14 so far as defense and foreign affairs are concerned
15 so as to secure the stability of East Asia.

16 "(December 1941)

17 "A PLAN FOR LAND DISPOSAL WITHIN THE GREATER
18 ASIATIC CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE.

19 "No. 1. Regions coming under Japanese rule where
20 a Government-General will be established."

21 Your Honor, we will not read the long
22 enumeration of countries which were to come under
23 direct Japanese rule, but will turn to the top of
24 page 5.

25 "REGIONS TO BE MADE INTO INDEPENDENT STATES."

"1. EAST INDIAN KINGDOM.

"All Dutch Possessions.

"British Borneo, Labuan Island, Sarawak, Brunei Cocos Island, Christmas Island, Andaman Islands, Nicobar Islands, Portuguese Timor (To be bought up in the future)."

We will not read the remainder of this list of future independent states. The Tribunal might want to consider it.

We next present excerpts from two documents compiled by the Total War Research Institute, containing plans for the consolidation of the Japanese conquests. These documents are lengthy but they are considered of some importance by us in view of the evidence which we will present later concerning the measures taken by Japan in the territories occupied by her as a result of the war.

1 MR. LAVERGE: We offer in evidence prose-
2 cution document 1621C, an excerpt from exhibit
3 689 for identification.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 1621C will receive exhibit No. 1335.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-
8 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 1335 and received in evidence.)

10 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read parts of
11 exhibit 1335. We shall first read the title page.

12 "Top Secret

13 "Establishment of East Asia.

14 "Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War.

15 "Doc. No. - Data of the Total War Research
16 Institute No. 46.

17 "Date of Compilation - 18 Feb. 1942 /17 shows/
18

19 "Number of copies prepared. - 150 copies

20 "Disposition - Kept in the Institute.

21 "Those distributed outside Institute to be
22 returned after use.

23 "Prepared at the Total War Research Institute."

24 We continue to read from the top of page 5
25 onward:

"Chapter I.

"General Policy"

"The necessary remote areas must be speedily secured to firmly establish a long-term endurance attitude; by practical application of the alliance, the war against the United States of America, Britain and China will be carried out. The preparations for war against Russia will be completed and we will promote the growth of New China, thereby effecting the first step towards the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. If it is unavoidable, we shall wage war against Russia. However, our chief object in pursuing the war to its end lies in the existence and development of our national power and special care should be taken to grasp the right time for war so as not to leave any regrets.

"On the termination of the present war, we must endeavor to firmly establish the foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We will make it our minimum requirement to prevent another war with China and we shall equip ourselves at the very least with conditions for the defence of our national independence in that direction.

"Chapter II""Strategy""Section I Directing of the War"

1 "1. In our resolution to carry out a long
2 period war, strategic points in the defence circle will
3 be occupied, and while we prosecute the war on one
4 hand, our essential powers of self-sufficiency will be
5 strengthened and secured on the other.

6 "In carrying out the war, England will be
7 our main object, and in order to maintain our position
8 of independence and initiative by every means possible
9 we will give special efforts to the destruction of the
10 American and English fleet. We will further strengthen
11 the prohibition of intercourse between the territories
12 under our power and the United States or England, and
13 will destroy the transportation on the west coast of
14 America as much as possible.

15 "We will take strict precautions in particu-
16 lar against the egress of national defence materials
17 for which the United States and England rely on East
18 Asia.

19 "2. Our attitude towards China will be to
20 secure the occupied territories according to the policy
21 previously arranged and to provide for the development
22 of necessary materials. We will promote the growth
23 of these so as to make them contribute towards the
24 establishment of a New China, and in the meanwhile we
25 will endeavour to crush and destroy the hinterland

1 (T.N. - i.e. Chungking) by exhausting their armed
2 forces, their economic abilities and every other
3 measure.

4 "3. We will try to utilize materials which
5 can be procured in the war zones, thus striving to
6 maintain and promote our national power, and at the
7 same time we will complete our military powers so
8 as to be able to overthrow the revived American and
9 English attacks that will follow the lapse of time,
10 especially any change in the European front.

11 "4. We expect good results from the German
12 and Italian domination in the Mediterranean, the
13 counter-blockade on England proper and the destruc-
14 tion of transportation on the east coast of the
15 United States.

16 "With the development of the situation we
17 will do our best to establish contact in (T.N. probably
18 with Germany and Italy) the Indian Ocean.

19 "5. In case of an actual German landing in
20 England proper, we will turn the resulting shock to
21 our own account and further strengthen our power in
22 the sphere of our influence.

23 "6. We hold it as our general policy to
24 avoid war with Russia at present, and will strive for
25 this end. However, preparations must be made to the

utmost, to prepare for any change in the situation.

"If the unavoidable happens, such as joint operations by the U.S.A. and Russia against Japan within our defence sphere, then we shall seize the opportunity to resort to military methods against Russia.

"7. If the Chinese hinterland proposes peace, we are ready to accept it. We will settle Sino-Japanese problems according to our policy previously arranged, and, if possible, we would like to advance and cooperate with India.

"8. We will comply with the request to cooperate in the armistice between Germany and Russia, and we may propose it ourselves according to circumstances. If this is put into practice, our security in the Manchuria-Russian border will be established; if possible, we further desire the advance and cooperation of Russia in Indian and Iran.

"In this event, we anticipate a German landing on British soil and also her domination in Africa.

"9. The cessation of hostilities between our country and the United States and England will be settled at the same time as that between Germany and England. (The U.S.A.)

"10. At the moment that hostilities cease on the European front, hostilities will be suspended in the

1 Greater East Asia War. We will try to settle Sino-
2 Japanese matters between ourselves, apart from other
3 problems, as far as possible.

4 "We must strictly guard against Europe and
5 the United States concluding a previous truce at the
6 sacrifice of East Asia. We must also prepare some
7 special way of dealing with things if the worst comes
8 to the worst."

9 We will now pass over the next few pages
10 and continue reading Chapter 2, Section 3, at the middle
11 of Page 10.

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1 "Chapter II Section III Occupied Areas
2 (anticipated occupied areas), and Their
3 Strategic Points

4 "1. The chief object of the territories to
5 be occupied in the Greater East Asia War is to secure
6 the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of
7 the war in accordance with what follows. The terri-
8 tories will be decided upon in accordance with the
9 progress of the operations, and on consideration of
10 how best to gradually solidify the foundation for es-
11 tablishing a nucleus group and a small Co-Prosperity
12 Sphere.

13 "(1) We must secure strategically vital
14 areas which would assist our offensive operations,
15 and at the same time capture the strong-points which
16 would afford a stronghold for the enemy counter-
17 attacks.

18 "(2) To secure territories which produce
19 materials necessary for the establishment of self-
20 sufficiency in order to complete our capacity for
21 prosecuting the war.

22 "(3) To control the areas necessary for
23 the blockade of enemy countries in essential materi-
24 als and the interception of their commerce and com-
25 munication."

1 "2. Every care must be taken to procure
2 materials essential to us in the Southern Regions
3 and at the same time we must control and smash the
4 enemy's military and economic counterattacks. We
5 must thoroughly enforce our counter-blockade of
6 Chungking and of the U.S.A. and Britain in respect
7 of strategy and urgently needed materials. The es-
8 sential points that we must pay attention to in the
9 course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. 1.

10 "3. In China, we must overthrow the Chung-
11 king regime and help the growth of a new China, there-
12 by securing a nucleus group, and ensure that all is
13 well with our procurement of materials essential to
14 us. The essential points that we must pay attention
15 to in the course of the occupation are given in Ap-
16 pendix No. II.

17 "4. In the Northern Regions, we must do
18 our best to secure a basic sphere of national de-
19 fence and maintain our superiority in strategic po-
20 sition. At the same time, we must ensure that all is
21 well with our procurement of strategic materials.
22 The essential points to which we must pay attention
23 in the course of the occupation are as given in
24 Appendix No. III."

25 The Appendices are not included.

1 "Chapter VI

2 "Section V. The Termination of Hostilities

3 "Chapter II Section V

4 "Part II Conditions of Security

5 "The main point of the conditions to be
6 secured at the termination of hostilities is to ap-
7 proach as near as possible to the concrete ideal of
8 establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty
9 Sphere, but the extent to which it can be realized
10 depends on our national power at the time, especially
11 on the extent to which we have secured the spoils of
12 our victory, and will also differ according to the
13 length of the war and the general aspect of the
14 world war situation at the time in particular, the
15 position of the countries on our side and the extent
16 of the exhaustion of the countries against us. Any
17 definite prognostication is, therefore, difficult, and
18 the situation will best be met by reliance on circum-
19 stances at the time, and by avoidance of inordinate
20 ambitions.

21 "We shall accordingly not go into details
22 here, but be content to enumerate the three basic
23 principles.

24 "1. When the war is soon over with enemy
25 countries left with a margin of

1 strength.

2 "Our maxim will be the securing of our ex-
3 istence and self sufficiency in the direction of the
4 establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

5 "(a) We shall take as our standard for
6 China the policy previously arranged, though if nec-
7 essary there is still some scope for mitigation.

8 "(b) In the Southern Regions, we will se-
9 cure a number of the most important military bases,
10 and establish a preferential hold on essential ma-
11 terials such as petroleum, iron, metals other than
12 iron, and foodstuffs.

13 "(c) (In the Northern regions, we will
14 settle the problems of the Coastal regions.)

15 "II When the war is brought to an end by
16 a single enemy defeat.

17 "Our maxim will be the establishment of a
18 basis for the building of the East Asia Co-Prosper-
19 ity Sphere.

20 "(a) We shall take as our standard for
21 China the policy previously arranged.

22 "(b) In the Southern Regions, we will se-
23 cure the necessary military bases. We shall let the
24 Philippines enjoy independence under our protection
25 and guidance and shall put British Malaya and North

1 Borneo under our jurisdiction. We shall establish a
2 special economic zone in the Netherlands East Indies
3 and secure a preferential hold on materials essential
4 for our country with French Indo-China, all contrib-
5 uting to the foundation of a small scale self-suffic-
6 iency sphere.

7 "(c) In the Northern Regions, we shall
8 take measures to sever East Siberia from the Soviet
9 Union.

10 "III When the war is terminated by an
11 enemy surrender with Japan still
12 left with a margin of strength.

13 "We shall plan the establishment of the
14 smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere at a single stroke.

15 "(a) We shall take as our standard for
16 China the policy previously arranged.

17 "(b) In the Southern Regions we shall se-
18 cure in toto all military bases in the smaller Co-
19 Prosperity Sphere; the Philippines and Burma will
20 have their independence under our protection and
21 guidance. In the Netherlands East Indies and French
22 Indo-China, self-government will be realized and spe-
23 cial zones essential for military and economic pur-
24 poses will be established there. British Malaya and
25 North Borneo will be annexed as Japanese territory

and will become the basis of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere. For Australia and India we shall prescribe the necessary economic union.

"((c) In the Northern Regions we shall complete the disposal of East Siberia.)

"Chapter III

"The Establishment of Operational Areas

"Chapter III Section II

"The Southern Regions

"Part I Military Affairs

"1. Policy

"The aims of the fundamental policy of the military establishment in the Southern Regions war zone are:

"(1) In order to accomplish the aims of the present war, strategic strong points of the most urgent necessity must be secured and controlled.

"(2) Although the fulfillment of the demands of the present operations come first, care must be taken to ensure that everything tends in the direction of the establishment of East Asia.

"These aims shall be realized in preference to the other policies for the Southern Regions.

"In military establishment, provisions necessary for operations and military activities will be

1 first completed, and after that, construction work
2 necessary for the maintenance of public order in
3 the district, general transportation, and the con-
4 trol of communications.

5 "Military administration will be established
6 in the occupied territories during the necessary per-
7 iod of operative activities, to control all the dif-
8 ferent construction work.

9 "11. Outline.

10 "(1) The Army and the Navy will bear par-
11 tial responsibility in establishing military admin-
12 istration, according to operational demands, the
13 characteristics of the area in question, and other
14 factors.

15 "(2) Military administration must grasp
16 the principle of the local administration and tri-
17 vial interventions must be avoided as far as pos-
18 sible. It will try to make use of the existing mach-
19 inery.

20 "(3) The public peace and order in the
21 occupied territories will be secured as far as pos-
22 sible by the ordinary police system and the native
23 army, with the assistance and support of the ex-
24 peditionary forces."

25 We will pass over the next few paragraphs
and continue to read at paragraph 12 on Page 15.

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1 "(12) The time for military administration
2 to change to ordinary administration will be generally
3 at the end of the war, after consideration of the actual
4 situation in the areas concerned, though there may
5 be cases when ordinary administration is introduced
6 before the termination of the present war, or the
7 military administration still continued even after the
8 end of the war, according to circumstances.

9 "Part II Politics

10 "No. 1

11 "1. The most important object of political
12 construction in the Southern Regions at present is to
13 comply with the demands of the present war, in
14 consideration of the ideal of the establishment of the
15 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (cf. Draft Plan
16 of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-
17 roprosperity Sphere.) In other words, although, of course,
18 we must crush the tendency in the Southern Regions to
19 reply on the United States and Britain and guide them
20 into a belief in ourselves as the leading nation,
21 we must lay stress on facilitating the procurement and
22 delivery of the necessary military materials, and on
23 carrying out operations.

24 "2. The form of administration in the
25 occupied areas will thus be military administration

1 during the war. As for its organization, a military
2 commanding officer or a governor-general will be appointed
3 to this office, with a number of able officials and
4 civilians under him, called upon to fully administer
5 the occupied territories.

6 "It is necessary to choose from the very first
7 the most able military officers and others for all who
8 are to participate in the military administration,
9 not to mention the Governor-General himself.

10 "The military administration will utilize
11 the present administrative system as far as possible,
12 and special care must be taken to restore and utilize
13 the local system.

14 "3. Concerning the management of the natives
15 of the occupied territories, it is better not to force
16 assimilative measures even in areas to be later annexed,
17 but to adopt such policies as will agree with the
18 natural abilities of the different races. It will be
19 the policy of military administration to exercise
20 strict control over the natives in all occupied areas
21 who have previously shown hostile feelings towards
22 us, and gradually slacken it. It will be our principle
23 to treat the Europeans and the Americans in the
24 occupied territories as we do the natives.

25 "4. The Chinese in the occupied territories

1 will also be treated in the same way. Strict supervision
2 will be exercised over those who have previously shown
3 hostility, but the others will generally be treated
4 justly with no special measures taken to oppress them.
5 We will take steps to make them cooperate in the
6 accomplishment of the present war, and especially to use
7 their assistance in the settlement of the China
8 Incident. Furthermore, our rule will be to control
9 the southward advance of the ordinary Chinese during
10 the war.

11 "5. The southward advance of the Japanese
12 will aim at the fulfillment of our wartime demands
13 of a military and economic nature, and, as a rule, it
14 will be restricted to essential personnel for the
15 occupied territories, great care being taken of their
16 selection and education.

17 "In the agricultural field, the rule will
18 be to limit the advance of the Japanese to technical
19 instructors.

20 "The return of Japanese who have lived in the
21 Southern Regions to the areas concerned will be permitted
22 on a preferential basis only to those who are eligible
23 as occupation members, but they must be selected and
24 trained before returning. Adequate selection and
25 training must also be given to military men discharged

overseas and the officials who retire abroad.

"Furthermore, when coming in contact with different races, officials and civilians must not feel that they are superior to them or treat them with contempt. On the other hand, they must be careful not to spoil the natives by being too anxious to win their hearts."

We will again skip a page and continue to read at point 4 near the bottom of page 17:

"4. The Philippines

"Military administration will be enforced for the present and a central political organ will be established under the Governor-General, which the Philippines will gradually be made to run themselves as far as possible. The independence of the Philippines will be accelerated as fast as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as it would be a means to instigate the desire for independence among the other natives of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and as we consider it a good example for the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is needless to say that in this case, too, they will have to cooperate positively in the war against Britain and the United States, and we shall hold onto our rights to station armies and to use certain places necessary as military bases even

1 after the war.

2 "5. Malaya and British Borneo

3 "Military administration will be enforced
4 for the present under the governor-general of the
5 occupation territories; Singapore and Penang will
6 be placed under his direct jurisdiction. The Governor-
7 General will be in direct control of the native rulers
8 and dispatch the requisite controllers to their dominions
9 to direct them. The administration of these dominions
10 and of areas smaller than provinces will be carried on
11 as far as possible on the lines of the existing machinery,
12 through efforts must be made to obliterate British
13 influence which has permeated all administrative organs,
14 so that measures to reform the British way of ruling
15 should be taken. We shall respect the native rulers'
16 political measures and help to raise the (I.N. political)
17 standard of the Malaysians. Furthermore, as regards
18 the effect of economic reforms we will carry out a number
19 of measures, giving the most consideration to the
20 maintenance of public peace and order.

21 "6. Netherlands East Indies

22 "Military administration will be established
23 under the Governor-General and the existing administrative
24 organs will be used to the utmost for minor or local
25 administration. On the principle of Netherlands

1 equality, some of the Dutch officials and Indonesians
2 will be employed indifferently. The most important
3 object in the Netherlands East Indies will be to fulfill
4 our economic demands or those necessary to carry out
5 the operations(especially petroleum), as this area will
6 be adjacent to the front for some time, and strict
7 military administration will be established. Measures
8 to aid the promotion of the position of the Indonesians
9 and to raise the standard of civilization must be adopted,
10 to make the Indonesians gradually change their attitude
11 towards the Dutch and give them the hope that within
12 a certain period after the termination of hostilities,
13 they will be permitted to enjoy independence.

14 "7. Burma

15 "Strict military administration will be
16 established in Burma as it is expected to be adjacent
17 to the front for quite a long period. However, the
18 existence of the Burmese' own administrative organ
19 will be recognized and this under our guidance will
20 become the nucleus of an independent government in the
21 future.

22 "Handling of the Indians in Burma must be
23 directed discreetly in consideration of the policy towards
24 India."
25

1 "Part III. Economics

2 "No. 1. Materials for national defense.

3 "1. Policy:

4 "(1) Construction policy during this
5 period is to restore and develop the production of
6 national resources, especially mineral resources, and
7 make these areas an important source of supply for
8 the heavy industry materials necessary for the central
9 power to accomplish the war, thereby aiming princi-
10 pally at the strengthening of our power to carry
11 out the war.

12 "(2) In construction and restoration
13 special stress shall be laid on petroleum, iron
14 ores, bauxite, copper and other non-iron metals.
15 The production of iron ores is the basis, but a
16 certain amount of reserve manufacturing equipment
17 (the selection of non-iron metal ores and a part of
18 the smelting process, if possible) and quite a
19 large amount of equipment for refining petroleum
20 will be constructed and restored.

21 "(3) As is the time limit for carrying out
22 these works, for the first and second years, the
23 aim will be the complete restoration of the damages
24 done by the war, after that, the necessary increase
25 in production will be attained."

1 "(4) For the aim of procuring necessary
2 materials rapidly, the areas where the least damage
3 was done by the war will be selected.

4 "However, greater importance is attached
5 to the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and the
6 Philippines in the real construction, as great
7 quantities of materials are expected to be procured
8 in these areas.

9 "(5) As for the method of construction, a
10 national organization will be established to include
11 the Southern Regions and unify and regulate the
12 construction, and under the overall jurisdiction of
13 this body, certain persons responsible for the de-
14 velopment of a certain material in a certain area
15 will be selected to undertake the increase of pro-
16 duction.

17 "(6) The production of such materials as
18 would prove superfluous, such as rubber and tin, will
19 be reduced to the amount necessary for our demands,
20 and the margin of construction power will both be
21 directed towards the more urgent demands. However,
22 in order to avoid confusion in the economy of the
23 area concerned, and to maintain a powerful weapon in
24 the armory of economic warfare by the material con-
25 cerned, a certain amount of production may still be

1 maintained in so far as it does not prove a heavy
2 burden on materials and labor.

3 "Part IV. Ideas and Culture

4 "1. Work in the ideas and culture of the
5 southern races must be carried out on the lines of
6 general policy for the development of ideas and
7 culture set out in Chapter V, and in consideration
8 of the fact that these races have been but recently
9 attached to us, that their standard of civilization
10 is very low, that their racial characteristics are
11 ones of mild behavior and they hold no anti-Japanese
12 feelings.

13 "2. Instruction by reason.

14 "(1) Propaganda.

15 "As the knowledge of Japan held by the
16 southern races is insufficient, every method and
17 occasion must be turned to account for propagating the
18 true Japan, and efforts should be made for the intro-
19 duction of Japan through publications and the estab-
20 lishment of organizations to spread information
21 about Japan. Lectures, exhibitions, moving
22 pictures and musical concerts should be given and
23 all other special methods adopted.

24 "(2) It is necessary to comply with the
25 characteristics and the civilization of each race

1 when carrying out propaganda, which thus has a
2 greater influence; further, the results of this
3 propaganda must be thoroughly investigated, and
4 the selection of the policy to follow also consid-
5 ered, so as to accord with the actual situation.

6 "(3) The propaganda system in the Southern
7 Regions must be extended and strengthened, and the
8 main outline of the propaganda and essential parts
9 of its organization must be held by the Japanese.

10 "(4) Although the object of the propa-
11 ganda is the controlling or intellectual class in
12 each district, special methods of propaganda among
13 the ignorant will also be adopted.

14 "(5) It is necessary to think of a way
15 to utilize the secret Chinese associations in the
16 south for our propaganda.

17 "(6) When the situation permits, it would
18 be a good idea to make the controlling or intellectual
19 class travel in Japan and introduce them to the
20 real situation in Japan, thus making them discard
21 their idea of relying on Europe and the U.S.A.

22 "II. Education:
23

24 "(1) The existing method and policies should
25 be reinvestigated and those based on the influence
of Britain, the United States and the Netherlands

1 should be abolished. Although changes in direction
2 will be made according to the general policy, there
3 will be no great changes in educational institutions
4 during this period, and care will be taken to utilize
5 existing institutions.

6 "(2) We will assist and direct the
7 spreading of national education and the instruction
8 of the younger generation in each district, and in
9 order to implant the idea of the East Asia Co-
10 Prosperity Sphere, text books for children, teachers
11 and the general population will be compiled; we will
12 cooperate in supplying them with teaching materials.

13 "(3) The public thoughts shall be firmly
14 established through the guidance and education of
15 the Army in each district.

16 "(4) Cooperation and guidance shall be
17 given to the training and re-education of the native
18 teachers.

19 "(5) Scholars and educationists of
20 superior ability shall be dispatched from our coun-
21 try to important points.

22 "(6) Elements of superior ability shall
23 be picked from among the various races (in the case
24 of an independent country they shall be recommended
25 by the government concerned and by a well-planned

1 system of sending students abroad. They will be
2 sent to our country (T.N. Japan) to study, and
3 during their stay in our country special institu-
4 tions shall be set up for them, so as to give them
5 proper guidance, and after they have finished their
6 studies practical use shall be made of them under a
7 certain definite policy.

8 "III. Thought Movements:

9 "(1) Although racial movements of an
10 innocent nature, characteristic of the races in
11 the various districts shall be nurtured and encouraged
12 (in case of an Independent country, guidance shall be
13 given indirectly through the Government concerned),
14 steps shall be taken so as to abolish the influence
15 of European and American Liberalism and Communistic
16 ideas. Especially when independence movements are
17 based on narrow-minded racialism or what tends to
18 be racial egoism, same shall be corrected and guidance
19 shall be given so as to make same turn into Oriental
20 moralism.

21 "(2) A powerful thought movement shall be
22 carried out and strengthened for the prosecution of
23 the joint war against Britain and the United States
24 so as to comply with the expansion of the (T.N. success-
25 ful) war results."

1 "(3) Consideration shall be given to the
2 gathering of men of leading spirit and intelligence
3 from the various districts so as to form a spiritual
4 organization representing the whole of East Asia,
5 thereby to contribute towards promoting the common
6 consciousness among the various races.

7 "3. Enlightenment through Facts.

8 "In conformity with the enlightenment based
9 on the above-mentioned ideals, efforts shall be made
10 to make the people realize the idea of the Co-pros-
11 perity Sphere through their actual living, by means
12 of concrete and practical measures. However, by
13 taking into consideration the actual situation of
14 the prosecution of war, same shall be realized by
15 degrees from those that are possible (T.N. to realize).
16

17 "(1) Development of Political Ideas.

18 "(1) It shall be made the main principle
19 to respect the natives' political volition as much
20 as possible, and it is necessary that, during this
21 period, efforts shall be made to relieve them of
22 their economic sufferings that are expected to appear,
23 and to adopt such political measures as would not
24 dampen their hopes towards the future. For example,
25 consideration should be given to maintenance and ex-
tension of the natives' rights to participate in the

1 government, the immediate abolition of the bad
2 laws and systems which were enacted by Britain, the
3 United States and the Netherlands that are painful
4 to the natives, the appointment and utilizing of
5 native officials and leaders, and other such measures
6 befitting to the actual conditions, thereby elevating
7 the hopes and enthusiasm of the natives.

8 "(2) The traditional spirit of the various
9 races shall be respected, and protection as well as
10 manifestation of the ancient sages and patriots,
11 whom the natives respect, as well as their surviving
12 descendants, shall also be considered.

13 "(II) Development of Economic Ideas.

14 "(1) It is estimated that the hardships in
15 the material living of the natives during this period
16 will become considerably aggravated, but it must be
17 expected that, for the sake of the prosecution of
18 the war, there may, for a while be no time for
19 considering their sufferings. Therefore, economic
20 development necessitates the utmost care, and not
21 only is it obvious that it must be avoided to cause
22 unnecessary economic sufferings, but the material
23 side of living of the natives requires handling
24 with compassion. For example, consideration shall
25 be given towards adequate measures which would touch

1 the hearts of the natives, such as the assisting
2 and education of the natives, the releasing of
3 farms belonging to hostile British and Americans,
4 the amending or abolition of bad taxes, which had
5 been levied by the British and Americans.

6 "(2) Although the hostile Chinese residents
7 in the South Seas shall be ousted, those who are
8 not so shall have their positions recognized and
9 as for their past support of Chungking, it shall
10 be aimed at making them switch over so as to have
11 them cooperate in the establishment of the East
12 Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

13 "(III) Development of Social Culture."--

14 THE PRESIDENT: That is sufficient for
15 the time being. These documents are of vital import-
16 ance as showing what the Japanese intended to do
17 with the conquered territories; nevertheless, Mr.
18 Laverge, it may be that for our purposes you need
19 not read so much of them. "You might consider that.

20 MR. LAVERGE: Yes, sir.

21 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen
22 minutes.

23
24 (Whereupon, at 1047 a recess was
25 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The President's remark
4 just before the recess has not been interpreted. It
5 will now be given.

6 (Whereupon, the statement above
7 referred to was interpreted into Japanese.)

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Laverge.

9 MR. LAVERGE: If the Tribunal please, we
10 would like to finish reading this document, which is
11 two more pages, and then read only five pages of the
12 next one, which will not take more than ten minutes.

13 I continue to read at the bottom of page 22:

14 "(1) The customs and morals peculiar to
15 the natives shall not be interfered with unless
16 same should greatly obstruct the establishment of
17 the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and it shall be made our
18 principle not to disturb or change the tranquility
19 of their private lives as much as possible.

20 "(2) Utmost cooperation shall be given
21 towards the rehabilitation works for the natives
22 having suffered war damages.

23 "(3) For the sake of spreading medical
24 treatment and sanitation, efforts shall be made to
25 build hospitals, travelling clinic organizations,

1 and institutes for the research of tropical
2 medical treatment and sanitation, as well as to
3 improve and expand medical schools.

4 "IV Linguistic Policy:

5 "During this period, efforts shall be
6 stressed for the popularization of the Japanese
7 language for the purpose of attaining the object
8 of making same the common language of East Asia
9 in the future, by banning English and Dutch as
10 official languages.

11 "Various measures shall be adopted such
12 as the opening of Japanese language schools at
13 important places, the appointment of natives who
14 understand Japanese as officials, or the popu-
15 larization of Japanese newspapers and publications,
16 as well as the teaching of elementary Japanese
17 through radio broadcasts.

18 "V Counter-measures towards the
19 Japanese on the spot.

20 "(1) It is necessary to strictly enforce
21 the following plans as the character and practice
22 of the Japanese on the spot who are constantly in
23 contact with the natives bear a decisive effect
24 on the spiritual and cultural development:-
25

"(1) To leave no stone unturned in

1 manifesting the Imperial Army in its true light.

2 "(2) To carefully pick out the Japanese
3 officials for positions on the spot and to
4 strictly enforce official discipline.

5 "(3) As regards the advance of Japanese
6 to the Southern Regions, general crossing-over
7 shall not be permitted, but shall be restricted
8 to only those who are to become the leaders, who,
9 while on the one hand, paying attention to the
10 protection and good treatment of the Japanese
11 residents on the spot, shall make them display
12 strict discipline so as to win the confidence
13 and respect of foreign races.

14 "(4) Importance shall be attached to
15 the education of the Japanese children on the
16 spot, and special institutes shall be erected
17 both in Japan and on the spot for the training
18 of educators to be sent there.

19 "(II) Special institutes shall be
20 established for the selecting, training and
21 dispatching of spiritual and cultural leaders.
22 In other words, plans shall be devised on a
23 national scale and enforced for the selection,
24 education and stationing of talented men, who
25 are qualified to introduce the true form of the

1 Empire and to contribute towards the moral
2 consolidation of the East Asiatic Races. These
3 persons must be able to come into close contact
4 with the actual life of the natives as spiritually
5 cultured persons without utilizing any power or
6 authority as a background, and must be qualified
7 to become teachers as well as friends of the
8 natives through the reality of their spiritual
9 and cultural living. It is also their duty
10 to investigate the actual conditions of their
11 respective districts and to gather information.
12 These leaders shall be selected and appointed
13 from the broad field of civilization, from
14 among the talented religionists, artists,
15 educators, scientists, technicians, economists,
16 and social workers.

17 "VI The ousting of those considered
18 as injurious to the Establishment of the East
19 Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

20 "(1) Efforts shall be made towards
21 preventing any Red propaganda activities by
22 the Soviet Union, and a strict control shall be
23 enforced over Communistic movements.

24 "(II) Although it shall be made the
25 principle to convert any anti-Japanese movements

1 by positive education, those of an obstinate and
2 malicious nature shall be crushed.

3 "(III) As it is anticipated that at the
4 counter-propaganda of Britain the United States
5 and the Soviet Union will be intensely active,
6 strict restrictions shall be imposed on the
7 listening in to broadcasts, newspapers and
8 publications shall be subjected to strict censor-
9 ship.

10 "(IV) As regards Christianity, the
11 missionary work of hostile English and American
12 missionaries shall be prohibited, and they shall
13 be substituted by native missionaries. More-
14 over, it shall be planned to dispatch Japanese
15 missionaries to the spots.

16 "(V) Literary works of art and pub-
17 lications tending to imply the adoration of
18 Europe and America and which are obstructive
19 to the establishment of the East Asia Co-Pro-
20 sperity Sphere shall be strictly banned, and a
21 clean sweep shall be made of thinkers and cul-
22 tural persons possessing no intention of aban-
23 doning their European and American hostile
24 feelings.
25

"VII Miscellaneous:

1 "The preparatory plans for the Estab-
2 lishment of East Asiatic Culture and the plans
3 for the Interchanging of Culture shall be based
4 on Part I."

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

2 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, I have been asked
3 to check on this matter on these two documents, exhibit
4 1334 and exhibit 1335.

5 THE PRESIDENT: We have already dealt with
6 1334, have we not?

7 MR. BROOKS: Sir?

8 THE PRESIDENT: Have we not already dealt
9 with 1334?

10 MR. BROOKS: That is right.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not want to hear
12 any more about it.

13 MR. BROOKS: I told the Court I would --

14 THE PRESIDENT: Two of us cannot talk at once,
15 Captain Brooks.

16 MR. BROOKS: I told the Court I would refer
17 to the matter in the proceedings to make it clear as
18 to weight, not as to admissibility, and to the point
19 that the prosecution referred to. The prosecution
20 referred the Court's attention to page 7368, where in
21 direct testimony the witness YATSUGI stated that these
22 were received from the Research Section of the War
23 Ministry. The Court's attention is also directed to
24 page 7381, where on cross-examination the answer, line
25 21, was that they were borrowed from the Investigation

1 Department of the War Ministry. And then attention
2 is directed to page 7382 on cross-examination on
3 these documents. It says, "If by your question" --
4 line 3 -- "you mean whether this was an official
5 document of the Army, I am unable to answer.* I do
6 not have the qualification to give proof on this
7 matter." And on page, the last one, 7385, starting
8 with line 3, the answer in reference to the documents,
9 "I don't know whether the document is official or
10 unofficial . . ." And line 8, where he states that
11 it is stated in the question that he was a member of
12 the unofficial staff of the Research Bureau of the
13 Ministry of War.

14 These things are called to the Court's atten-
15 tion because they would go to the probative value and
16 possibly the weight to be given to these documents.

17 THE PRESIDENT: The fact that they were found
18 in the war office is enough for us.

19 MR. LAVERGE: We now offer in evidence
20 prosecution document 2402B, being excerpts from
21 exhibit 588, for identification.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
24 No. 2402B will receive exhibit No. 1336.

25 (Whereupon, the document above referred

1 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1336
2 and received in evidence.)

3 MR. LAVERGE: We read a few parts of the docu-
4 ment:

5 "Title page.

6 "Secret.

7 "Draft of Basic Plan for Establishment of
8 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

9 "By Total War Research Institute.

10 "Date of Compilation: 27 January 17 Showa 1942.

11 "Copies: 150.

12 "Disposition: To be kept within the Insti-
13 tute. Those copies sent outside will be returned after
14 use."

15 We turn to the last paragraph on page 2:

16 "(2) The Form of East Asiatic Independence
17 and Co-Prosperity:

18 "The states, their citizens and resources,
19 comprised in those areas pertaining to the Pacific
20 Central Asia and the Indian Ocean formed into one
21 general union are to be established as an autonomous
22 zone of peaceful living and common prosperity on be-
23 half of the peoples of the nations of East Asia. The
24 area including Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower
25 Yangtze River and the Russian Maritime Province,

1 forms the nucleus of the East Asiatic Union. The
2 Imperial country possesses a duty as the leader of
3 the East Asiatic Union.

4 "The above purpose presupposes the inevitable
5 emancipation or independence of Eastern Siberia, China,
6 Indo-China, the South Seas, Australia, and India.

7 "(3) Regional Division in the East Asiatic
8 Union and the National Defense Sphere for the Imperial
9 Country.

10 "In the Union of East Asia, the Imperial
11 Country is at once the stabilizing power and the
12 leading influence to enable the Imperial Country
13 actually to become the central influence in East Asia,
14 the first necessity is the consolidation of the inner

15 It of East Asia; and the East Asiatic Sphere shall
16 be divided as follows for this purpose:

17 "The Inner Sphere -- It is the vital sphere
18 for the Imperial Country; it included Japan, Man-
19 churia, North China, the lower Yangtze Area and the
20 Russian Maritime area.

21 "The Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere -- This
22 is the smaller self-supplying sphere of East Asia
23 and includes the inner sphere plus Eastern Siberia,
24 China, Indo-China and the South Seas.

25 "The Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere -- This is

1 the larger self-supplying sphere of East Asia, and
2 includes the smaller Co-prosperity Sphere, plus
3 Australia, India and island groups in the Pacific.
4 Parallel with the divisions shown above and at the
5 same time the following spheres of national defense
6 for the Imperial Country shall be set up, and those
7 spheres shall be made the basis for the defense of
8 East Asia.

9 "Basic Sphere -- It covers approximately
10 the inner sphere and is the zone which requires ab-
11 solute safety.

12 "Defense Sphere -- Covering approximately
13 the smaller Co-rosperity Sphere, it is the zone which
14 must be perfectly defended against any invasion from
15 Europe or America.

16 "Sphere of Influence -- Generally corre-
17 sponding to the size of the Greater Co-Prosperity
18 Sphere, it is this zone in which a superior position
19 should be maintained against attacks from Europe or
20 America.

21 "For the present, the smaller Co-Prosperity
22 Sphere (the defense sphere) shall be the zone in
23 which the construction of East Asia and the stabili-
24 zation of national defense are to be aimed at. After
25 their completion there shall be a gradual expansion

1 toward the construction of the Greater Co-Prosperity
2 Sphere (the sphere of influence);"

3 I now turn to page 9, middle of page, chap-
4 ter 3:

5 "Chapter 3. Political Construction.

6 "(1) Basic Plan.

7 "The realization of the great ideal of
8 constructing Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity requires
9 not only the complete prosecution of the current
10 Greater East Asia current war but also presupposes
11 another great war in the future. Therefore, the
12 following two points must be made the primary start-
13 ing points for the political construction of East
14 Asia during the course of the next twenty years.

15 "1. Preparation for war with the other
16 spheres of the world.

17 "2. Unification and construction of the
18 East Asia Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere.

19 "The following are the basic principles for
20 the political construction of East Asia, when the a-
21 bove two points are taken into consideration:

22 "a. The politically dominant influence
23 of European and American countries in the Smaller
24 Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be gradually driven out
25 and the area shall enjoy its liberation from the

1 shackles hitherto forced upon it.

2 "b. The desires of the peoples in the
3 sphere for their independence shall be respected
4 and endeavors shall be made for their fulfillment
5 but proper and suitable forms of government shall
6 be decided for them in consideration of military
7 and economic requirements and of the historical,
8 political and cultural elements particular to each
9 area."

1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Laverge, I have received
2 a note from a colleague. He asks what is the use of
3 reading this first draft when the second has already
4 been read?

5 MR. LAVERGE: Your Honor, the draft I read
6 previously has a later date than this one.

7 THE PRESIDENT: That is what my colleague
8 suggests, I think.

9 MR. LAVERGE: The draft read previously
10 deals with the first five years, and this draft deals
11 with the next twenty years. It is, therefore, that
12 this draft comes in order behind the previous one.

13 THE PRESIDENT: That appears in the para-
14 graph you are about to read, I take it. Proceed with
15 it. But we must trust your judgment, up to a point,
16 of course.

17 MR. LAVERGE: I will continue reading.

18 "It must also be noted that the independence
19 of various peoples of East Asia should be based upon
20 the idea of constructing East Asia as 'independent
21 countries existing within the New Order of East Asia'
22 and that this conception differs from an independence
23 based on the idea of liberalism and national self-
24 determination.

25 "c. During the course of construction,

1 military unification is deemed particularly important,
2 and the military zones and key points necessary for
3 defense shall be directly or indirectly under the con-
4 trol of our country.

5 "d. The peoples of the sphere shall obtain
6 their proper positions, the unity of the people's minds
7 shall be effected and the unification of the sphere
8 shall be realized with the Imperial country as its
9 center.

10 "e. The autonomous position of the sphere
11 shall be strengthened by mutual supplying of needs. An
12 outline of the distribution of the East Asiatic peoples
13 and their character is given in the Table 6.

14 "(2) The political form of the East Asiatic
15 areas after twenty years.

16 "The ideal political forms 20 years hence
17 for the areas of East Asia when organized upon the
18 principle mentioned above may be given as follows:
19 (They are the ultimate forms, and the time and means
20 of their realization will vary according to the situa-
21 tion. Military affairs within the Co-Prosperity
22 Sphere will be taken up by the Imperial Country in
23 view of the necessity for defense. The details of
24 this defense are, however, here excluded."
25

I now turn to paragraph 9 on page 12, your

Honor.

"9. British Malaya and North Borneo

"a. Singapore and such of its nearby areas (including the Dutch East Indies) as are of military importance shall be made parts of our territory at an appropriate time.

"b. In the other regions, sultans or local lords shall be allowed to exist, and, after their unification, they shall be our protectorate, their autonomy being allowed.

"The people of this area are too low in living standards and political capacity to stage any racial movements. Therefore, it is necessary to bring up the native races in conformity with the military and economic requirements.

"10. The Dutch East Indies and nearby areas (excluding areas to be incorporated)

"They shall have their independence, when a suitable time comes, under the organization of an 'Indonesian Federation.' They shall be placed under the protection of our country. This protection is necessitated by economic and military considerations.

"In the area hitherto called the Dutch East Indies, the area centering around Java has, it is recognized, a comparatively high standard of culture, and

1 also has carried on a rather intensive campaign for
2 independence. Culturally and politically /Javanese/
3 independence is recognized to be appropriate. But
4 the rest of the land, despite a few installations and
5 businesses, is generally an area of primitive barbarity
6 with a small number of native tribes. This is very
7 marked in Guinea. In view of the above circumstances
8 and from the military development of East Asiatic
9 Sphere natural resources points of view, the area
10 will, even after its independence, require consider-
11 able protection and interference.

12 "11. Hawaii, Midway, the Australian man-
13 dates, New Guinea, the Eastern Archipelagos, New
14 Caledonia and other South Pacific Islands

15 "As these islands are of great military
16 importance and have no notable races, they shall be
17 made a part of our territory as necessary.

18 "12. Australia and New Zealand.

19 "They shall become our territory ultimately
20 as the construction of East Asia progresses. The aim
21 shall be to make them areas for the emigration of the
22 Japanese race.

23 "13. India.

24 "In accordance with the progress of East
25 Asiatic construction, the aim will be to make India

1 an independent country and a unit in the East Asiatic
2 Union. The necessary relationship with our country
3 will be maintained."

4 I should like to read two more pages, your
5 Honor.

6 "(3) The Cardinal Points of East Asiatic
7 Unification

8 "East Asia can be said to be a Co-Prosperity
9 Sphere only when the peoples of the sphere have real-
10 ized a firm and solid union into the same ideal of
11 East Asiatic construction as our own. Especially in
12 view of the probable strife against the other world
13 spheres while the construction is carried on, the East
14 Asiatic peoples' ties should be strong enough as to
15 enable our country to rise in leadership of the coun-
16 tries of the Sphere.

17 "That purpose primarily and essentially
18 necessitates the perfection of the Imperial Country's
19 high-degree defense structure and the strengthening of
20 the national power spiritually and materially. Only
21 on this foundation can the Union of East Asia be set up.

22 "Since the construction of the East Asia
23 Co-Prosperity Sphere has the Imperial Country as its
24 center and since the construction is furthered by the
25 Imperial Country, the substance of the unification

1 lies in the Imperial Country becoming actually the
2 center and in the strengthening of the direct ties
3 between our country and the countries and nations of
4 the Sphere. The detailed methods of unification vary
5 according to the differences in the people's conditions
6 (in their politics, economics, histories and cultures),
7 and very also with varying degrees of military impor-
8 tance as seen from the standpoint of the defense of our
9 country and of East Asia. Though the details depend
10 on the country involved, some principles in this con-
11 nection may be given as follows:

12 "1. Cooperation among Japan, Manchukuo and
13 China shall be strengthened.

14 "2. Manchukuo in the north and the Malayan
15 area in the south shall be the key points of East
16 Asiatic construction. The relations of both areas
17 with our country shall be unseverably strong.

18 "Committees shall be formed, for instance, by
19 the peoples of the sphere under Japanese guidance for
20 mutual settlement of the peoples' various affairs and
21 for mutual understanding and cooperation. The offices
22 of the committees shall be, if necessary, located in
23 Japan.

24 "An absolutely uniform system of administra-
25 tion shall not be adopted for the unification of the

1 peoples whose historical, cultural and particularly
2 living conditions vary to a notable extent.

3 "3. Military key points shall be secured.

4 "4. Popular economic dependence upon our
5 country shall be strengthened.

6 "5. The common ideals of the establishment
7 of the Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be enforced for that
8 construction.

9 "6. Emigration of able-bodied Japanese
10 overseas shall be encouraged.

11 "7. The universal diffusion of the Japanese
12 language and the inter-change of culture shall be
13 carried out."

14 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Laverge, I think that the
15 general opinion of the Members is that you are over-
16 elaborating.

17 MR. LAVERGE: All right. We will not read
18 any further from this document.
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1 We respectfully invite the Tribunal's
2 attention to Exhibit 675-A, being excerpt from a
3 file of newspaper articles from the 'Taiyo Dai
4 Nippon.

5 With the Tribunal's permission, we will
6 read a few paragraphs from an article entitled "The
7 Greater East Asia Sphere Under Imperial Influence" by
8 the accused HASHIMOTO, appearing in the Taiyo Dai
9 Nippon of 5 January 1942, which have not been read
10 before. We start reading at the last paragraph on
11 page 5 of the English text.

12 "Although full studies are necessary and
13 careful considerations should be given to the racial,
14 historical, economic, military and other factors in
15 deciding how these countries should be divided and
16 administered. I think it appropriate to apply the
17 following general principles:

18 "1. Give independence to each race and give
19 each its proper place.

20 "2. Incorporate completely into Japanese
21 territory those areas where the inhabiting races have
22 no capacity for independence, or areas which are
23 strategically important.

24 "From this standpoint, Greater East Asia
25 may be divided administratively as follows:

1 "1. Districts which are to be Japanese territory:

2 "a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong.

3 "b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes.

4 "c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast
5 of India.

6 "d. Australia, New Guinea and New
7 Zealand.

8 "e. Other islands in the Pacific and
9 Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar).

10 "2. Independent Countries:

11 "Manchukuo, China (special areas to be
12 designated in North China and Fukien), Burma (in-
13 cluding Bengal area of India), French Indo-China
14 (French control to be withdrawn in the future), India,
15 Philippines, Afghanistan (to be given Baluchistan),
16 Siam (to be given portions of Malaya and Burma), and
17 Java.

18 "Territories incorporated into Japan should
19 be administered by Governor-Generals, while Japanese
20 advisers should be appointed for independent states.
21 Military and diplomatic affairs should be placed
22 absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters
23 also should be controlled by Japan.

24 "A Supreme Council for the Greater East
25 Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be set up

1 in Tokyo, under which there should be set up a
2 Planning Board for the Greater East Asia Sphere
3 under Imperial Influence in order to handle business
4 affairs."

5 And then one more paragraph near the bottom
6 of page 7:

7 "Education and Religion

8 "1. The cardinal principle is to spread and in-
9 culcate the ideology of the Greater East Asia
10 Sphere under Imperial Influence.

11 "2. The spirit of labor should be cultivated.

12 "3. Anti-American and Anti-British movements should
13 be launched and solidarity sought.

14 "4. Culture should be improved and guidance given
15 so as to develop superior races. This is to
16 prepare for the great future fight between the
17 white race and the colored races whose culture
18 is inferior to that of the European races.

19 "5. There should be freedom of religion, but
20 Christianity should be destroyed step by step,
21 while 'TENNO' teaching should be disseminated
22 and thoroughly inculcated step by step.

23 "6. The Japanese language should be the common
24 language in the Greater East Asia Sphere under
25 Imperial Influence."

1 On 11 January, 1942 the first Japanese
2 troops landed in Netherlands Indies territory and
3 the Japanese government issued an official declara-
4 tion on this occasion. This declaration is con-
5 tained in prosecution document 1555-M, an excerpt
6 from exhibit 879 for identification, which we now
7 offer in evidence.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
9 terms.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
11 ment 1555-M will receive exhibit No. 1337.

12 (Whereupon, the document above
13 referred to was marked prosecution's
14 exhibit No. 1337 and received in evidence.)

15 MR. LAVERGE: We will read exhibit 1337.

16 (Reading) "Excerpt from Tokyo Gazette, Vol.
17 V, No. 8, February 1942, page 415.

18 "CONCERNING THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES

19 AGAINST NETHERLANDS FORCES

20 "-----Statement of the Government Issued by the Board
21 of Information on January 12, 1942-----

22 "Although the Japanese Government previously
23 declared war on the United States and the British
24 Empire, they have refrained from taking any hostile
25 measures against the Netherlands in their earnest

1 desire of avoiding, if possible, calamity of war
2 befalling the inhabitants of the Netherlands East
3 Indies. The Netherlands Government, however,
4 have notified the Japanese Government that, in view
5 of the opening of hostilities by Japan against the
6 United States and the British Empire with which the
7 Netherlands is in a close and inseparable relation-
8 ship, they recognize that a state of war has come
9 to exist between Japan and the Netherlands. Not
10 only that, the Netherlands forces have since actually
11 resorted to various hostile acts toward Japan and,
12 furthermore, the Netherlands has turned her colony
13 of East Indies into bases of the United States, the
14 British Empire and the Netherlands in their war against
15 our Empire.
16

17 "Japan entertains no intention whatever of a
18 hostile nature toward the innocent inhabitants of
19 the Netherlands East Indies. But, in view of the
20 necessity of destroying the hostile acts of the
21 Netherlands as well as of protecting the lives and
22 property of Japanese nationals there, the Imperial
23 Japanese military and naval forces commenced
24 hostilities against the Netherlands forces on
25 January 11."

We offer for identification only, prosecu-

1 tion document 1038, a collection of stenographic
2 records of the proceedings of the Japanese Diet.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
4 ment 1038 will receive exhibit No. 1338 for identi-
5 fication only.

6 MR. LAVERGE: We offer in evidence an
7 excerpt from prosecution document 1038, a speech by
8 Foreign Minister TOGO before the 79th Session of
9 the Diet on 22 January, 1942. That should be 97.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
11 terms.

12 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
13 1038, being excerpt from the previous exhibit, will
14 be given exhibit No. 1338-A.

15 (Whereupon, prosecution document
16 No. 1038 was marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 1338 for identification only, and excerpt
18 from said document was marked prosecution's
19 exhibit No. 1338-A and received in evidence.)

20 MR. LAVERGE: We will read exhibit 1338-A.
21 (Reading)

22 "Minister of State Shigenori TOGO's
23 Speech
24 (January 22 1942)
25

"I have the honor to state my view here,

1 when Japanese Forces are winning under the august
2 virtue of His Majesty, American and British invasion
3 bases are being overturned, and the great undertak-
4 ing of the establishment of Greater East Asia is
5 making progress.

6 "I pray for the success of our soldiers,
7 who are fighting at the front, and mourn from my
8 heart for the war-dead. At the same time I feel
9 sympathy and pay my respects to those Japanese people
10 who are stationed in enemy countries and in the
11 theater of war, where they are enduring hardships,
12 and I wish their health.

13 "Now we are fighting with a great determin-
14 ation and advancing the aim of this war. Although
15 our enemies have spread propaganda, it has been
16 admitted by the peoples of the world that it is truly
17 unavoidable for us to take up arms in this war. The
18 emancipation and prosperity of East Asia must not
19 be satisfied by the leaders of America and Britain.
20 "We are going on towards our aims with a conviction
21 that the emancipation and prosperity of East Asia
22 are our tasks which are given by the world. We are
23 justified for this war, and so the Japanese Forces
24 are winning marvelous war results where the spirits
25 of Gods are issued forth. These facts have startled

1 the world.

2 "As I stated before the previous Diet
3 session, this is the war in which we down America
4 and Britain, who have been selfish, invasive and
5 aggressive, and who have intentions of controlling
6 the world. On the other hand, the nature of this
7 war is for the emancipation of East Asia and for the
8 establishment of the new world order. Accordingly,
9 the governments of Manchukuo and China have fully
10 understood our intentions in the prosecution of the
11 war since its outbreak and have cooperated with a
12 positive zeal. French Indo-China has also cooperated
13 with Japan. Thailand has discerned the aim of this
14 war and has also cooperated with Japan. She has been
15 determined to eliminate American and British in-
16 fluences, which have been the roots of evil in East
17 Asia. On December 21 last year, she concluded the
18 alliance with Japan. The Japanese Government will
19 pay respects to the excellent views of the leaders of
20 Thailand and give full support to their constructive
21 efforts. Actually cooperation between the two has
22 increased. And thus, our diplomatic organization
23 has been steadily completed. The spirit of coopera-
24 tion between Japan and these friendly countries has
25 made the carrying out of the war and control of the

1 South easy.

2 "As you know, the connection between
3 Japan, Germany and Italy has become ever increasingly
4 tight, and the close cooperation has been embodied,
5 step by step in military affairs, economy, diplomacy,
6 and all the other matters. Whatever America and
7 Britain may do to attempt to separate Japan, Germany,
8 Italy, and other friendly countries from each other,
9 there must be no room allowed them to accomplish
10 this aim. The iron combination of the Axis Powers
11 stands as firm as a rock, which will become more and
12 more dense. Of course, the Axis Powers are quite
13 different from the so-called group of Allied Powers
14 who gathered many exiled governments. The Neutrality
15 Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union has still
16 been kept and remains unchanged.'

17

18 "We are going to keep the good relations
19 between Japan and the neutral countries in South
20 America and Europe from now on to as long as possible.
21 If the countries in South America are not tempted by
22 America and do not show their hostile and unfriendly
23 attitudes toward Japan, we will fully respect their
24 positions. So we will gaze with keen interest at the
25 present Rio de Janeiro Conference. Our true enemies

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1 same time it decides the joint destiny of all races
2 in East Asia; so it is natural that the areas abso-
3 lutely necessary for the defense of East Asia must
4 be grasped by Japan. It is also natural, in view
5 of the justification of this war, that the areas which
6 have been American and British territories, be given
7 their proper **standings** in accordance with the tradi-
8 tions and cultures of their races.

9 "It is truly evident that this war, the
10 aim of which is the establishment of the Greater
11 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, based on such funda-
12 mental principles, is quite different from the so-
13 called invasive war. The leaders of America and
14 Britain, who want to explain this war with the word
15 'invasive', have only proved that they kept to that
16 idea and style in accordance with their doings. We
17 did not expect the fighting of races which has been
18 propagated by our enemies, so we have not admitted any
19 necessity for it. Japan also does not fight with a
20 narrow-minded exclusive intention. The idea of the
21 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has not the
22 nature of exclusiveness. Accordingly, it is evident
23 that the relation of economy and communication will be
24 dense between the countries in this sphere and the
25 other friendly countries as the establishment of this

sphere makes progress.

1 "In order to carry out the construction of
2 the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan,
3 who has had the leadership of all races in East Asia,
4 must have her grand view and conception and clear
5 cognition in regard to the principle of co-prosperity.
6 Moreover, she must show her positive attitude accord-
7 ing to the construction of the East Asia Co-Prosperity
8 Sphere in her various organizations and fully meet
9 the expectations of the races in East Asia. Conse-
10 quently, our duty has been more and more grave, and
11 we, the Japanese nation, must conquer various diffi-
12 culties with the connection of all Japanese, accomplish
13 the glorious undertaking, and reward to the honor that
14 we live in the Holy era when our country is rising."
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1 We offer in evidence prosecution document
2 1038-B, a further excerpt from this same exhibit
3 for identification, being a speech by Prime Minister
4 TOJO before the same session of the Diet, on
5 22 January 1942.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 1038-B will receive exhibit No. 1338-B.

9 (Whereupon, the document above
10 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1338-B, and was received in evidence.)

12 MR. LAVERGE: We will read the speech.

13 "Minister of State Hideki TOJO's Speech.

14 " 'At the opening ceremony of the Imperial
15 Diet, H.I.H. the Emperor honored us with an Imperial
16 Rescript. We are filled with trepidation and gratitude.
17 In obedience to the Imperial thought, we must pursue
18 our respective duties with might and main, promptly
19 prosecute the aim of the war, and thus ease His
20 Majesty's anxiety.

21 " 'I am very happy to say, since the outbreak
22 of the war, there has been no enemy who has been able
23 to stop the Japanese troops from advancing. We are
24 winning gloriously everywhere and upset almost all
25 the enemy's strategic points in East Asia in a short

1 time. We are strengthening more and more the pressure
2 upon the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Our defense of
3 northern frontier is perfect. It is a matter for
4 hearty congratulations that by these victories the
5 prestige of our country is being enhanced. This is
6 solely attributable to the august virtues of His
7 Majesty, for which we are filled with gratitude. I
8 express my thanks and pay my respects to the brave
9 Japanese soldiers who are winning numerous battles
10 on the various fronts in vast areas in spite of the
11 heat and cold for their pains and distinguished
12 military services from the bottom of my heart. I
13 mourn for the dead and sympathize with the bereaved
14 families and the wounded.

15 "Now, the cardinal principle for directing
16 the Greater East Asiatic War, in which Japan is now
17 engaged, is, while expanding our fighting strength by
18 securing strategic points in Greater East Asia and
19 by bringing under our control areas containing impor-
20 tant resources, to fight out this war until the United
21 States and Britain are defeated by carrying out
22 aggressive operations in close concert and cooperation
23 with Germany and Italy. America and Britain have for
24 a long time prepared to conquer the world. These two
25 countries are the most wealthy. I can easily imagine

1 they will counter-attack obstinately and try to
2 recover from their discouraging situation, so we must
3 prepare for various difficulties and a long war.
4 The true war must be in the future. In order to
5 carry out the aim of this holy war, all our people
6 must do their best for our country with the faith
7 of victory in defiance of difficulties. The spirit
8 of thrift, militarism, and self-devotion to the State
9 are indispensable, not only to overcome these diffi-
10 culties at the present but also for our country to
11 thrive.

12 "Now, Japan is engaged in the undertaking
13 of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
14 Sphere, as she pushes the grand military operations
15 with all her might. The fundamental purpose of
16 establishing this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
17 Sphere comes truly from the great spirit of Japanese
18 foundation; namely to enable all nations to find their
19 proper place, and to establish the order of co-
20 prosperity based on morality in which Japan is the
21 center. This establishment will be made by the
22 cooperation of various races in vast areas. The new
23 areas which will take part in this establishment have
24 been extremely exploited and their development of
25 culture has been bitterly checked by America and

1 Britain for the past 100 years, despite their great
2 resources.

3 "Japan is going to establish an eternal
4 peace in Greater East Asia, and will moreover construct
5 a new world order with friendly countries under this
6 new plan with which we will make an epoch on human
7 history in East Asia, including these new areas. Of
8 course, this is really a great undertaking. The aim
9 of this important undertaking is to lead our military
10 successes to final victory.

11 "In constructing this, we have a mind to
12 bring under our power those areas which are absolutely
13 indispensable for the defense of Greater East Asia and
14 to deal with the others properly in accordance with
15 traditions and culture of every race, and the changes
16 of war situations.

17 "Our Imperial Army and Navy forces have
18 already captured Hongkong, taken the greater part of
19 the Philippines, and suppressed the best part of
20 Malay. Moreover, recently they have occupied strategic
21 points of the Dutch East Indies. In view of the fact
22 that among these areas Hongkong and Malay have been
23 British dominions for many years, and are bases of
24 trouble in East Asia, we will not only eliminate
25 the roots of evil, but will also make them strategic

1 Points of defense in Greater East Asia.

2 "Regarding the Philippines, the honor of
3 independence will be given them willingly by Japan,
4 if they understand our true intention and cooperate
5 as members of the establishment of the Greater East
6 Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Our intention for Burma
7 is the same as for the Philippines.

8 "When Dutch East Indies and Australia con-
9 tinue their bearing to resist Japan we will crush them
10 without hesitation. However, when their inhabitants
11 understand our true intention and cooperate with us,
12 we will give support to their development and welfare
13 with our full understanding.

14 "It is very regretable that the Chiang Kai-
15 shek regime continues to resist Japan, and we will
16 crush them to the last. I hereby emphasize there is
17 now a chance for them to gaze correctly at the world
18 situations, to abandon old relations with them,
19 America and Britain, and to take part in the great
20 undertaking of constructing the Greater East Asia
21 Co-Prosperity Sphere.

22 "It is a matter for congratulation that all
23 the people of Manchukuo, China, and Thailand have
24 made constant efforts together with Japan for the
25 establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

1 Sphere and that French Indo-China has also cooperated
2 in it.

3 "It is a matter for mutual congratulation
4 that our friendly countries, especially Germany and
5 Italy, are steadily obtaining war results with Japan
6 for the establishment of the new world order. We will
7 tightly unite with them in military, diplomatic, and
8 economic relations, and make progress to accomplish
9 our joint aims. The situation which we intend to
10 effect is that at the beginning of the war we will
11 establish military administration, set about the
12 immediate tasks necessary for the prosecution of war,
13 prepare for the great construction of the future and
14 make expand the limits of participation in the adminis-
15 tration of the inhabitants, with the establishment of
16 public peace, order, and defense in East Asia. In
17 view of the fact that our scheme regarding the construc-
18 tion of Greater East Asia is farsighted, it is neces-
19 sary to prepare thoroughly so as to take care of the
20 establishment and to obtain the cooperation of offi-
21 cials and civilians whose abilities are all mobilized.

22
23 "In accordance with the beforementioned
24 situations, and in order to expect the development of
25 our country, the present immediate duty is to crush
our enemies more and more, strengthen our fighting

1 power, and establish the organization for the certain
2 victory. Therefore, all national systems must be con-
3 centrated upon them.

4 "Consequently, all departments of the
5 government will establish the policies necessary for
6 the prosecution of war, and carry them out promptly.
7 Namely, in order to maintain and increase the
8 producing capacity in war-time, we will concentrate
9 materials, labor, electric power and funds chiefly
10 into the leading enterprises which are more impor-
11 tant than others, and make the most of the equipment
12 which we have now, and at the same time, we will
13 take into consideration the expansion of production
14 of important industries necessary for the national
15 defense, and the counter-plan for the war-time foods
16 necessary for the security of the national life. At
17 the present the most important problem is transpor-
18 tation facilities rather than the shortage of resources,
19 so we will make special efforts to construct ships,
20 thereby improving and strengthening communications
21 and transportations. Again, in order to prosecute the
22 national policies, the accumulation of people's funds
23 is absolutely necessary. Accordingly, it is the
24 Government's intention to exert further efforts in
25 the future for the promotion of people's savings."

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1 that these speeches might be considered to lay down
2 Japan's basic policy for the construction of a
3 Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under Japanese
4 leadership.

5 We shall now offer in evidence a number of
6 documents, dealing with Japanese military operations
7 in the Netherlands Indies. The next three of these
8 documents will show how the Japanese armed forces
9 attempted to seize the important oil installations on
10 the Island of Borneo in the Netherlands Indies. In
11 this connection we would like to draw the Tribunal's
12 attention to exhibit 628, which has been recently read
13 by us. It was stated therein that in order to obtain
14 possession of the industrial resources of the Nether-
15 lands Indies intact, those who in any way destroyed
16 or damaged industrial installations would be severely
17 punished.

18 We offer in evidence prosecution document
19 2624-A, a sworn statement by Major G. L. Reinderhoff,
20 Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

22 MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, we ask
23 the prosecution if this witness is going to be pro-
24 duced for cross-examination, either direct or cross-
25 examination.

1 THE PRESIDENT: What would you hope to be
2 the effect of the cross-examination?

3 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, we are not
4 quite certain from this document if this is what the
5 witness actually saw or what he heard. I would like
6 to inquire from the prosecution the purport of this
7 document.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we will be able to
9 judge what he heard and what he knew independently.

10 The document is admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 2624-A will receive exhibit No. 1339.

13 (Whereupon, the document above
14 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
15 No. 1339, and was received in evidence.)

16 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read part of exhibit
17 1339, starting at the eleventh line from the top of
18 page 1.

19 "Q What can you relate concerning all you
20 know about the war crimes committed at the occupation
21 of BALIKPAPAN by the Japanese?

22 "1. I only know about the above mentioned
23 war crimes on account of my work with the N.E.F.I.S.
24 (at that time at BRISBANE), from interrogations, inter
25 alia, of the Javanese Sergeant SARBINI and the

1 Javanese Rifleman BENOH; later on, after contact in
2 Batavia in 1945 with personnel originating from
3 Balikpapan. All this is recorded with NEFIS.

4 "2. As for the threatened prospect of murder
5 at BALIKPAPAN and TARAKAN I know the following:

6 "In January 1942, whilst still prisoners of
7 war, together with Lieut. Col. S. DE WAAL, Reserve
8 Captain VAN DER VEGT and Reserve Captain COLIJN on
9 board the Japanese Staff ship, the following was
10 communicated to Capt. COLIJN and myself: that we were
11 to be transported by motor launch to BALIKPAPAN;
12 that if the destruction of the oilworks at BALIKPAPAN
13 should be effected, in the event of imminent Japanese
14 landings - as we had stated would be the case - further,
15 if BALIKPAPAN were to be defended, or even if the
16 Dutch garrison were to resist such landing, then all
17 POWs and all other European residents of both sexes
18 at TARAKAN would be killed, as well as all soldiers
19 and European residents of both sexes who might fall
20 into the hands of the Japanese at BALIKPAPAN.

21 "This statement is recorded in a document made
22 out in Japanese characters and undersigned with name
23 stamps, with English translation attached. Contents
24 were read out by the Chief of Staff, a Major, with
25 the help of an interpreter, in the presence of the

1 Commanding General, a Major-General, Division Com-
2 mander, plus five other Japanese officers. This
3 occurred in the long room of the ship on which we
4 were prisoners.

5 "When later on, we managed to leave the Dutch
6 motorboat used by Japanese on the way, and to reach
7 BALIKPAPAN by a Dutch Navy plane, the above-mentioned
8 document with its English translation was handed over
9 to the Troop Commander, Lieut. Col. VAN DEN HOOGENBAND.
10 When Capt. COLIJN and I were sent on by plane to
11 BANDOENG, these documents were delivered to General
12 Headquarters there."

13 THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to give us
14 evidence of what NEFIS means, or will that be--

15 MR. LAVERGE: That, your Honor, can be seen
16 from the certificate; that is the Netherlands Forces
17 Intelligence Service. That is the counterpart of
18 ATIS in Tokyo.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
20 past one.

21 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
22 taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

4 MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, just before
5 the recess I raised a question concerning exhibit
6 No. 1339 concerning an ultimatum. The next document
7 concerns that ultimatum and I should like to ask the
8 prosecution if that ultimatum is to be presented to
9 the Court.

10 MR. LAVERGE: The ultimatum is not available
11 itself, Mr. President, but we have the affidavits of
12 two persons who both saw and handled it. The ultimatum
13 itself has been lost due to war.

14 MR. BLEWETT: The affidavit states that it was
15 turned over to a high officer of the Netherlands Army.

16 MR. LAVERGE: I don't want to be giving
17 evidence, but the point is that practically all the
18 records of the Netherlands Indies Government have been
19 destroyed during the Japanese occupation.

20 THE PRESIDENT: You are giving the best evi-
21 dence available?

22 MR. LAVERGE: Yes, sir.

23 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot do more.

24 MR. LAVERGE: We offer in evidence prosecu-
25 tion document 2618, a sworn statement by Colonel

1 C. van den Hoogenband, Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 2618 will receive exhibit No. 1340.

5 (Whereupon, the document above referred
6 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1340 and
7 received in evidence.)

8 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read part of Exhibit
9 1340, starting at the beginning of the last paragraph
10 on page 1:

11 "On January 20, 1942, an ultimatum from
12 the Japanese Commander of the troops at Tarakan was
13 handed to me, in my capacity as commander of the
14 troops at Balikpapan, by Captain of the Reserve Colijn,
15 Administrator of Tarakan, Captain of the Infantry
16 Reinderhoff- (both of whom had succeeded in escaping
17 from captivity as prisoners of war) - in the presence
18 of Captain of the Reserve K. Scholtens, Manager of
19 the B.P.M. at Balikpapan, and Naval Commander van
20 Nieuwenhuizen. The ultimatum was drafted in Japanese,
21 and English translation being attached. It stated that
22 overwhelming Japanese forces were advancing on Balikpapan
23 and that, in view of their superiority, I was
24 requested to surrender Balikpapan to them in its
25 entirety and undestroyed. If I did not comply with

1 this request, all Europeans would be murdered.

2 "After reading this document, I asked Mr.
3 Colijn whether all the Europeans to be murdered would
4 include the Europeans, amongst whom were women and
5 children, who were already in Japanese hands at Tarakan.
6 Mr. Colijn was of opinion that these would be included,
7 and requested me to accept the ultimatum in order there-
8 by perhaps to alleviate the fate of the Europeans in
9 Tarakan. The reply was drafted in English, wherein
10 I stated that I had received the necessary orders as
11 regards destruction, which, therefore, had to be carried
12 out.

13 "I had the reply sent through Naval Lieutenant
14 K. M. R. van Brakel, since deceased, who, as I heard
15 later from others, handed over this letter to the crew
16 of the Japanese vessel from which Messrs. Colijn and
17 Reinderhoff had escaped, which vessel he found near
18 the Makaham-delta.

19 "I may add to this, that I was informed that
20 in Tarakan no murders took place, but they did occur
21 at Balikpapan on February 20, 1942. I was not present
22 at Balikpapan on that date, as on January 24th I had
23 fought my way to the airport of Samarinda II, and
24 thence on February 8th I had been evacuated to Bandoeng.

25 "Why in regard to the two men who brought you

1 the ultimatum, did you speak of escape from captivity
2 as prisoners of war?

3 "Messrs. Colijn and Reinderhoff were official-
4 ly appointed as bearers of the ultimatum and were,
5 therefore, on their way in a boat with some Japanese.
6 On the way they hailed a Dutch plane, which picked them
7 up and brought them to me. The accompanying Japanese
8 were persuaded to agree to this.

9 "What happened further to the ultimatum?

10 "I handed over the ultimatum to Messrs Colijn
11 and Reinderhoff who left by aeroplane for Java on
12 January 20th, with instructions to hand this document
13 to the Commander-in-Chief."

14 We offer in evidence prosecution document
15 2620A, a sworn statement by J. T. van Amstel.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
18 No. 2620A will receive exhibit No. 1341.

19 (Whereupon, the document above referred
20 to was marked prosecution's document No. 1341
21 and received in evidence.)

22 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read part of exhibit
23 1341, starting at the tenth line from the top of page 1:

24 "In January, 1942, I was serving on a trans-
25 portship, under the command of Lieutenant Engles R.N.

1 At sea near Tarakan we were attacked by and shot at
2 from a Japanese plane. The plane also dropped bombs
3 which did not hit the mark. I was shot in my right
4 calf. A naval flying boat transported me to Balikpapan,
5 where I was accommodated in an emergency hospital.
6 This was on January 11, 1942.

7 "The Japanese invaded Balikpapan on January 24,
8 1942. Around February 20 a rumour circulated in the
9 hospital, which was especially spread around by native
10 male nurses, that on February 24, 1942, all Europeans
11 were to be slaughtered. On February 23, 1942, all white
12 people, totalling eight, all patients, were fetched
13 from the hospital and taken away. They left me alone,
14 probably because I have a rather dark skin.

15 "In the night of February 23/24, 1942, I es-
16 caped from the hospital and mingled with the popula-
17 tion of Dam kampong near there. I dressed up as a
18 native. On February 24, 1942, the inhabitants of that
19 kampong were called together by the Japanese, I was
20 among those people. We were taken to a place on the
21 beach, the old fort Kiandassan, where I saw that the
22 Europeans, white people, were already standing together.
23 I was at about 50 meters distance from the group of
24 Europeans.
25

"I recognized in the group Dr. Arns, doctor

1 of the B. P. M., Dr. Dick Staal, Captain doctor, vicar
2 Kruisberg, and one of the eight patients who had been
3 taken from the hospital the day before, called Rosenberg.
4 I also saw three catholic priests dressed in white.
5 I saw a district-officer in uniform and a police
6 inspector in uniform. A Japanese officer started a
7 conversation with that district-officer of which I
8 could not understand a thing, but I saw that during that
9 conversation that officer was ill treating the district-
10 officer by blows in his face with the hand, and further
11 with the scabbard over his body. There was a lot of
12 shouting by Japanese standing near, so that I could not
13 understand anything. The Jap officer who had started
14 the talk with the (Dutch) district-officer, drew his
15 sword and hewed off both the district-officer's arms,
16 a little above his elbows, and then his two legs at
17 the height of the knees. The district-officer was
18 also taken to a coconut tree, bound to it and stabbed
19 to death with a bayonet. The body remained hanging
20 on that tree. After this, the same officer went
21 over to the policeman in uniform; I heard later that
22 his name was Karseboom; he was kicked and beaten with
23 the hand and with the sword in the scabbard. After
24 this, that (Jap) officer hewed off his arms under the
25 elbow and his legs near the knees. I heard him shout

1 once more 'God save the Queen'. With bayonet thrusts
2 and kicks the policeman was made to stand up and,
3 standing on his leg stumps, he was stabbed to death
4 with a bayonet. One of the Roman Catholic priests,
5 I do not know his name but it was a grey-haired man,
6 stepped forward and started a conversation with the
7 Japanese officer which I did not understand, but which
8 may have been a request to pray. I saw at least that
9 he kneeled down near the bodies and prayed. He then
10 blessed both bodies and the whole group of Europeans.
11 The Europeans were then formed into groups of 10 to
12 15 each, and their hands were tied on their backs. The
13 group was driven into the sea by shouting, kicking and
14 hitting Japanese, until they were in the water up to
15 about their breasts; then they were shot at one after
16 the other, slowly, by Japanese soldiers, until all had
17 died.

18 "It was impossible to float away into the
19 sea because at about 30 meters from the beach there
20 was a barbed wire entanglement. Thus all the Europeans
21 were driven into the sea, group by group, and slaughter-
22 ed off in the same manner. Among the last group were
23 the three Catholic priests. Again I saw the old one
24 among them start a conversation with the Jap officer,
25 I saw him blessing the floating bodies, after which

1 that group also was driven into the sea and killed
2 off. The entire group of Europeans killed thus must
3 have numbered from 80 to 100 men. The natives were
4 forced to look on, those who wanted to go away were
5 brought back with beatings and violence. I also saw
6 some native women faint."

7 I won't read any more of this.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett:

9 MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, the defense
10 calls for the production of this witness for cross-
11 examination.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Is he in Tokyo or in Japan?

13 MR. LAVERGE: He is not in Tokyo, your Honor.
14 If my information is correct, he is in the Netherlands
15 Indies.

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will give you all facilities
17 to interrogate him, Mr. Blewett. We will consider
18 whether he could be called as a witness but you must
19 give us some reasons why he should be called.
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1 MR. LAVERGE: The next two documents which
2 we submit in evidence will show how, after Japanese
3 troops had landed on the main island of the Nether-
4 lands Indies, the Island of Java, the Japanese Com-
5 mander-in-Chief in the Netherlands Indies threatened
6 the Netherlands authorities that unless all Nether-
7 lands Forces surrendered, the town of Bandoeng in
8 Java would be bombed.

9 We offer in evidence prosecution document
10 2622-A, a sworn statement by Lieutenant A.F.P. Hul-
11 sewe, Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
14 No. 2622-A will receive exhibit No. 1342.

15 (Whereupon, the document above re-
16 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 1342 and received in evidence.)

18 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read part of Ex-
19 hibit 1342, starting at the first paragraph at the
20 top of page 2:

21 "On February 22, 1942, as a naval ratings,
22 second reserve, untrained, I was called up for ser-
23 vice with the Royal Navy, with orders to report to
24 the Navy Department at Bandoeng. I reported there
25 on 23 February and was attached to a section of the

1 War Office, under the direct orders of Commander L.
2 Brouwer, R.N. (at present in Tokyo, Japan.) On 2
3 March I was commissioned as sub-lieutenant, Royal
4 Naval Reserve, Special Service Branch.

5 "On 6th March at approximately 22.00 hours I
6 was summoned by my colleague of the Bureau for East
7 Asiatic Affairs, H. HAGEMAAK (at present in Holland)
8 to attach myself immediately to the suite of His Ex-
9 cellency the Governor-General of the Netherlands East
10 Indies, where I duly reported. The next morning

11 I informed the War Office.

12 "On 7th March at approximately 15.30 hours the
13 Governor-General and his suite moved from the resi-
14 dent's house to a villa on a hillside on the outskirts
15 of Bandoeng, after a Japanese bombing attack, during
16 which bombs had fallen on all sides of the Resident's
17 house.

18 "During the early part of the morning of 8 March
19 there were several Japanese planes continuously over
20 Bandoeng. Because of the danger of air attack - I
21 do not remember whether any bombs were actually
22 dropped; in any case not in our vicinity - the
23 Governor-General and most of his suite (I amongst
24 them) were in the very large and commodious air raid
25 shelter built deep into the hillside. The shelter

1 G.O.C. Airforces, who made a fiery speech com-
2 memorating Japan's victory. After considerable
3 time, two hours at least, the Governor-General was
4 asked to choose a small number of people to ac-
5 company him at the coming talks, as there would not
6 be sufficient space to accomodate the whole Nether-
7 lands East Indies party. Eventually we proceeded to
8 a married officers' quarters close by.

9 "The talks were held in the dining room; the
10 front room was filled with newspaper reporters and
11 moving picture people and the communicating double
12 doors were wide open. The Governor-General sat
13 facing Lieut. Gen. IMAMURA; at his right hand Lt.
14 Gen. Ter Poorten, I do not remember the seating of
15 Maj. Gen. Bakkers (Chief of Staff) and Maj. Gen.
16 Pesman (G.O.C. Bandoeng area.) Behind the chairs
17 Messrs. Kiveron, Idenburg and myself - possibly
18 also Mr. Hagenaar, were left standing. On Lt. Gen.
19 IMAMURA's right was his Chief of Staff, on his left
20 the G.O.C. Airforces. Behind their chairs there
21 stood a considerable number of Japanese officers, at
22 least twenty.

24 "The talks must have started about 16.30 hours.
25 I have no clear recollection of the exact sequence
of the questions and answers, nor, of course, of their

1 complete contents. However, this was my first at-
2 tempt at interpreting and I found it uncommonly dif-
3 ficult, particularly as Lt. Gen. IMAMURA persisted
4 in quoting a draft, written in the usual high flown
5 style, more easily read than understood. The result
6 was that after about ten minutes I was floundering
7 so badly that a Japanese left the ranks behind the
8 General's chairs and offered to take over and was
9 permitted to do so; he was T. MIYOSHI, formerly of
10 the Japanese Consulate-General at Batavia.

11 "The first question was, whether the Governor-
12 General as Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands East
13 Indies sea, land and air forces had come to submit
14 the surrender of these forces. The answer took some
15 time, as it gave rise to several new questions. The
16 short of it was: no, he had come because he had
17 been summoned to be present at talks concerning the
18 surrender of Bandoeng, with the threat that this town
19 was to be destroyed by aerial bombing in case he did
20 not appear. Furthermore he was unable - willingness
21 apart - to hand in any surrender terms, as his con-
22 stitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of the N.E.I.
23 Forces had been expressly cancelled by the Nether-
24 lands Government a few days previously. The reply
25 to these statements was, that the Japanese were not

1 going to let themselves be tricked by a piece of
2 political skull-duggery and, that in their eyes, the
3 Governor-General still was the Commander-in-Chief of
4 the N.E.I. Forces.

5 "The next point was: surrender of the N.E.I.
6 Forces. The Governor-General maintained that he had
7 been summoned in connection with the surrender of
8 Bandoeng only. This question was entered into at
9 some length. The Japanese made two points: 1.
10 Bandoeng was only of small importance, it was theirs
11 for the taking, as the outer defences had already
12 been smashed; two or three days more would see them
13 in the town. 2. The G.O.C. Airforces insisted that
14 the surrender of Bandoeng - town or area - would be
15 useless, as air reconnaissance had shown con-
16 siderable bodies of N.E.I. troops withdrawing into
17 the difficult mountain area around the Bandoeng
18 plateau.

19
20 "The upshot of these discussions was the renewed
21 demand of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief that the
22 Governor-General tender the unconditional surrender
23 of all N.E.I. Forces, the demand now accompanied by
24 the threat that unless he complied, Bandoeng was to
25 be bombed flat.

"After some more talk the unconditional surrender

1 was agreed to, with two or three days grace for
2 ti ops in outlying areas. The whole proceedings were
3 verbal; I do not remember the Governor-General signing
4 any document."

5 We offer for identification only, prosecu-
6 tion document 2674, being an ATIS Report, dated 11
7 August, 1943, containing an account of the Netherlands
8 Indies operations as found in a captured enemy
9 document.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
11 No. 2674 will receive exhibit No. 1343 for identifi-
12 cation only.

13 (Whereupon, the document above re-
14 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
15 No. 1343 for identification.)

16 MR. LAVERGE: We offer in evidence an ex-
17 cerpt from the aforesaid report, prosecution's
18 document 2674A.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

22 MR. LEVIN: I would like to object to the
23 admission of this document on the grounds that its
24 origin, or authenticity, is doubtful.

25 THE PRESIDENT: It is an English translation

1 of a captured document, according to the certificate.

2 Mr. LEVIN: This states, "containing an
3 account of the N.E.I. O.P., as related by a Lieut.
4 Colonel, apparently copied from the Osaka MAINICHI."
5 Now, they have to come to some conclusion as to where
6 it was copied from, and the doubt is created as to
7 where it was obtained. It seems to me it is not in
8 the same category as a captured enemy document or a
9 document found in the official files of the govern-
10 ment.

11 THE PRESIDENT: The Charter contemplates
12 such things as diaries, which I take to include
13 private diaries being used where they are captured.

14 Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
16 No. 2674A will receive exhibit No. 1343-A.

17 (Whereupon, the document above re-
18 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 1343-A and received in evidence.)
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2 Mr. LEVIN: This states, "containing an
3 account of the N.E.I. O.P., as related by a Lieut.
4 Colonel, apparently copied from the Osaka MAINICHI."
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6 it was copied from, and the doubt is created as to
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8 the same category as a captured enemy document or a
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12 such things as diaries, which I take to include
13 private diaries being used where they are captured.

14 Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
16 No. 2674A will receive exhibit No. 1343-A.

17 (Whereupon, the document above re-
18 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 1343-A and received in evidence.)
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1 MR. LAVERGE: We shall read one page of
2 exhibit 1343A starting at the top of page 1.

3 "BARGAINING UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT.

4 "Cowardly Surrender.

5 "At 1600 hours, we arrived at the aerodrome.
6 HQ was at the side of the aerodrome. In one of
7 the HQ rooms there were a number of high ranking
8 DUTCH INDIES officers and also about 10 men wearing
9 civilian clothes, so I realized for the first time
10 that the Governor-General was here. There was an
11 interview with the enemy Governor-General and his
12 subordinates shortly afterwards in the house of a
13 certain officer of the DUTCH INDIES Flying School.
14 It was in a neat room. There was a long table in the
15 centre. Three generals, the Army Comdr., the Army
16 Chief of Staff and BUTAI Comdr. ENDO were seated on
17 the right. Behind these, sat the Staff Officers.
18 Governor-General TARKENBERG and his subordinates
19 came in. Across from the Army Comdr. was the Gover-
20 nor-General, on the left of him was the Army Comdr.-
21 in-Chief TERPOORTEN, next were various Staff Officers,
22 while the enemy staffs and civilian officials stood
23 in the rear. The Governor-General and Army Comdr.-in-
24 Chief were questioned by Comdr. INAMURA as to what
25 power they possessed. Governor-General stated that

1 he does not have the prerogative of supreme command
2 which was a very strange thing. It is a funny thing
3 that from long ago, the military and civilian ser-
4 vices were in the hands of the DUTCH INDIES Governor-
5 General yet only the Navy was under the direct con-
6 trol of the Queen. I don't know if it was the evading
7 of the responsibility on the arrival of WAVELL that
8 caused the trouble. And again when the Army Comdr.
9 asked, 'Will you surrender unconditionally?' the
10 Governor-General was calm, shook his head. Then
11 he said, 'Just a moment, I don't know whether he is
12 a reporter or a photographer by the door, so will
13 you please have him removed.' 'In that case, why
14 did you come?' asked the General. 'You asked me,
15 so I accepted your invitation and came. I was plan-
16 ning to discuss the matter with the JAVA Civil
17 Administration,' he retorted. Next he faced the
18 Comdr.-in-Chief of the Army and asked, 'Will you
19 surrender unconditionally?' 'Please only accept the
20 surrender of BANDOENG!'. 'The BANDOENG area is not a
21 problem as far as we are concerned.' 'The only
22 problem is, are you willing to surrender uncondition-
23 ally, or do you refuse to surrender the DUTCH INDIES?'
24 He said, 'I know very well that we are not an enemy
25 of the JAPANESE Army.' At that time the Governor-

1 General stared pointedly at the Comdr.-in-Chief of
2 the Army. No matter how many times he was questioned,
3 he only mentioned the armistice of BANDOENG.

4 "General INAMURA solemnly said, 'There is no
5 use for further questioning. If you don't sur-
6 render unconditionally, there isn't any other way
7 but to attack continuously. Your commanders will
8 return to BANDOENG immediately. You will be pro-
9 tected by our troops up to the sentry line, but if
10 you step over the sentry line, we will attack
11 BANDOENG with our aircraft which are on the aero-
12 drome loaded with bombs. However, I will give you
13 this last chance to consider. I will give you ten
14 minutes from now to make the final decision,' and so
15 saying he arose."

16 We will not read further from the document.
17 The next documents will be introduced by Mr. G.
18 Osmond Hyde.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

20 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, Members of the
21 Tribunal, we now come to the last section of our
22 proof, referring to Japanese occupation and consoli-
23 dation of Japanese conquests. We offer in evidence
24 prosecution document No. 2754, entitled "Course of
25 Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control

1 and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World
2 War", a document found in the Japanese Foreign Office.

3 Mr. President, with respect to the certificate
4 I desire to call your attention to the following:
5 There is one certificate attached to the processed
6 copies. There is a usual certificate attached to
7 the original. Through inadvertence, when the
8 second certificate -- that is the one that is at-
9 tached presently -- was put on the copies, the usual
10 certificate was removed. However, the usual one
11 is with the original document handed to the Clerk.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

13 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we object
14 to the introduction of this document and any further
15 evidence offered by the prosecution with respect to
16 any political acts that were taken by Japan in the
17 Netherlands East Indies after December 8, 1941. I
18 would like permission to argue this motion, if the
19 Court please.

20 THE PRESIDENT: That is based on the formal
21 declaration of war by the Netherlands?

22 MR. LOGAN: That is right.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that involves the de-
24 cision of the question now of whether it was an
25 aggressive war by the Japanese against the Netherlands.

1 We will hear that argument at the conclusion of
2 all the evidence. If we support your view, then,
3 Mr. Logan, of course this document and others will
4 be disregarded necessarily.

5 MR. LOGAN: If it is possible, however,
6 we would like to have a decision on this at this
7 time because it would involve a saving of time on
8 the part of the Tribunal listening to more documents
9 and testimony which is proposed to be introduced by
10 the Netherlands prosecution; and, also, it would
11 narrow the issues and assist the defense in the
12 preparation of their cases.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Your point is that it is
14 no longer a mixed question of law and fact; that
15 the mere declaration formally, as may have been made
16 by the Netherlands made it purely a question of law.

17 MR. LOGAN: That is right, your Honor. In
18 other words, once the declaration of war was made
19 by the Netherlands, Japan could no longer be accused
20 of aggressive war by virtue of her taking the
21 offensive.

22 I might also point out, your Honor, that it is
23 also immaterial and irrelevant to the charges in the
24 Indictment under which this prosecution section is
25 proceeding; to wit; 1, 4, 5, 14 and 32.

1 THE PRESIDENT: If there were no charge in
2 respect of the Dutch except aggressive war, there
3 might be something in what you say; but, of course,
4 we have the conventional war crimes alleged by the
5 Dutch against the Japanese.

6 MR. LOGAN: The conventional war crimes
7 involves another proposition of law, your Honor.
8 I am arguing strictly on political acts such as
9 any nation takes towards a vanquished nation.

10 THE PRESIDENT: The decision on the points
11 you raise would not discharge the Dutch prose-
12 cution from the case. We would still be here to
13 the end of it hearing Dutch evidence and submissions.
14 We will not give our decision piecemeal. One
15 judgment is contemplated by the Charter.

16 MR. LOGAN: I appreciate that, your Honor;
17 but this question now goes to the materiality and
18 relevancy of the evidence proposed to be introduced.

19 THE PRESIDENT: The decision is as I have
20 already stated, Mr. Logan.

21 MR. LOGAN: I, of course, must accept it,
22 your Honor.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 2754 will receive exhibit No. 1344.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1344 and received in evidence.)

MR. HYDE: I will read through the first paragraph only at this time.

"Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War.

"1. Prior to the outbreak of World War II various estimations were made by the Supreme Command and the government regarding the problem of political control and reversion of the southern occupied areas, including the Dutch Indies. From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry had attached importance to the independence of the Dutch Indies."

I will leave that document for a few moments.

Before taking up the next documents, in order to show what the Foreign Ministry and other Japanese authorities meant by the use of the term "independence" in connection with the occupied territories, we desire to call the Court's attention, for consideration in connection with this section of our proof, to the various plans of Japan prior to and immediately after the outbreak of the war for the future of the occupied territories, contained in the following exhibits:

1 exhibit No. 628, exhibit No. 1334, exhibit No. 1333A,
2 exhibit No. 1336, and exhibit No. 1335.

3 We further draw the Court's attention in con-
4 nection with the actual decisions, negative or
5 positive, of Japanese authorities with regard to
6 the future of the East Indies to exhibit No. 877,
7 Details of the Execution of Administration in the
8 Southern Occupied Territories, and with regard to
9 the public utterances of Japan's Government in this
10 respect to exhibit No. 1338B, Speech of Prime
11 Minister TOJO in the Diet on 22 January 1942.

12 The intentions of Japan with respect to the
13 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are further
14 indicated in prosecution document 1086, the meetings
15 of the Privy Council on the proposed establishment
16 of the Greater East Asia Ministry in the period of
17 9-24 October 1942.

18 Prosecution document 1086 has heretofore been
19 marked exhibit 687 for identification. This document
20 is now offered in evidence.

21 MR. LOGAN: If your Honor please, we move to
22 strike out this summation of the various documents
23 which have just been offered in evidence. They have
24 all been read. There is no necessity for that.

25 THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection to a

1 brief restatement of the purpose of introducing
2 these documents. It is for our convenience.

3 MR. HYDE: Was the document admitted?

4 THE PRESIDENT: The document?

5 MR. HYDE: I tendered document 1086 which
6 has hithertofore been marked exhibit 687 for identi-
7 fication.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is admitted on
9 the usual terms.

10 This one is already marked for identification,
11 N. . 687. Now you want to tender it finally.

12 MR. HYLE: That is correct, sir.

13 THE PRESIDENT: It will have the same number.
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1 MR. HYDE: Mr, President, it was identified
2 on 9 October 1946.

3 I now will read parts from exhibit No. 687.
4 I will read the first four lines at the top of page 1:

5 "The First Meeting of the Investigation Com-
6 mittee concerning establishment of the Greater East
7 Asia Ministry and eight other items. Meeting held
8 on 9 October 1942 (Friday) at Privy Council Office"

9 From the list of persons attending this meet-
10 ing we will read only the names of those who are now
11 accused:

12 "Councillor MINAMI

13 "Prime Minister, concurrently War Minister TOJO

14 "Chief Secretary of Cabinet HOSHINO

15 "President of the Planning Board SUZUKI

16 We continue to read from the top of page 2:

17 "(Meeting called to order 1:30 P.M.)

18 "Chief of Investigation Committee calls meet-
19 ing to order.

20 "Premier TOJO made an outline explanation
21 regarding the purport and the contents of the draft.

22 "Committee Member ISHII inquired that:

23 "(1) The establishment of the Greater East
24 Asia Ministry will excite suspicion as though Japan
25 will consider the hitherto friendly countries of the

1 East Asia Sphere as Japan's colonies. It may lead to
2 such that both material and spiritual co-operation
3 cannot be expected. Consequently, would the enemy
4 countries not take advantage of this and would it not
5 cause concern in bringing about an unfavorable effect
6 in the attitude of India? Would it not be better to
7 establish a combined organization of East Asia coun-
8 tries than risk such disadvantages?

9 "To this inquiry Premier TOJO replied:

10 "In order to achieve victory, which is an
11 absolute necessity for Japan, the combined fighting
12 power of East Asia must be strengthened. However,
13 the various organs of Japan in the Co-Prosperity Sphere
14 at present are confusedly set up and find difficulty
15 in maintaining unified and active measures. Therefore,
16 it is desired to establish a ministry and to appoint
17 a responsible minister, thereby establishing an appro-
18 priate national policy in achieving the aforementioned
19 aims, and to be sure of a swift and decisive execution
20 of this policy. Moreover, Japan has already openly de-
21 clared to the world the construction of Greater East
22 Asia, so there is no need of restraint in using the
23 term 'Greater East Asia Ministry' at this time. It
24 is preferable to use this term voluntarily. In regard
25 to the effect it may have toward foreign countries, the

1 countries within the Co-Prosperity Sphere all have
2 ties with Japan and since after all, the object of
3 this draft is to plan for the benefit of the Co-
4 Prosperity Sphere, this misunderstanding will be
5 solved. In regard to other third countries, it is
6 sufficient if counteracted with propaganda and there-
7 fore, will not be grounds to hesitate on this plan.
8 In regard to the attitude of India, no reaction is
9 noticed. The East Asia Combined Organization Pro-
10 posal will be studied hereafter as a political prob-
11 lem and has no relation to the establishment of the
12 Greater East Asia Ministry'.

13 "Committee Member MINAMI (Hiroshi) inquired:

14 "2. In treating the independent countries
15 within the Greater East Asia Sphere as mandates of
16 Japan or as occupied territories, the question was
17 asked whether this would not be the cause of uneasi-
18 ness of these countries and the cause of alienation
19 of the people.

20 "Prime Minister TOJO replied that this draft,
21 from the viewpoint of achieving victory, is intended
22 to establish an organization for the construction of
23 Greater East Asia. In its operation close attention
24 should be paid in regard to the alienation of the re-
25 lative countries."

1 We now turn to the top of page 4, and I will
2 read the first three lines:

3 "The Second Meeting of the Investigation
4 Committee Concerning the Establishment of the Greater
5 East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items. Meeting
6 held on 12 October 1942 (Monday) at Privy Council
7 Office".

8 We will now read the names of those who are
9 now accused who were present:

10 Prime Minister, concurrently War Minister TOJO
11 Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
12 President of the Planning Board SUZUKI
13 Councillor MINAMI, (Hiroshi).

14 We now turn to the top of page 5 and I will
15 read to the middle of page 7:

16 "(Meeting Called to Order 10:00 A.M.)

17 "Chief of Investigation Committee SUZUKI calls meeting
18 to order.

19 "From Committee Member USHIO:

20 "(1) He asked whether it was not necessary
21 to have a powerful liaison organ between the Greater
22 East Asia Minister and the Ministers of the other
23 offices, besides the Liaison Committee. Prime Minister
24 TOJO replied that since war guidance is a problem of
25 the entire state the Government and the Supreme Command

1 have already set up a liaison conference and is now
2 deciding the basic policy. Foreign Minister TANI stated
3 that, in regard to the relations between the Foreign
4 Office and the Greater East Asia Ministry, there is a
5 direct mutual exchange of important foreign informa-
6 tion, and besides, with the shifting of personnels,
7 and etc., practical liaison will be effected. . .

8 "(2) He queried into the relations of the
9 Greater East Asia Ministry with the administration of
10 the Southern occupied zone, and stating in effect
11 that it would be better to have administration in
12 occupied zones in the interim replaced immediately by
13 a permanent Greater East Asia Administration and there-
14 by create a fait accompli. In reply to his query made
15 to the views of the Government authorities, Prime
16 Minister TOJO stated that the Southern Occupied Areas
17 are now under military administration and, therefore,
18 the authority of the Greater East Asia Ministry is
19 excluded; but eventually full preparations will be
20 made providing for the time when the Southern Occupied
21 Areas detaches itself from military administration
22 onto civil administration. Furthermore, the military
23 itself is desirous of having the military administra-
24 tion in the Southern Occupied Areas speedily replaced
25 by civil administration; and even now designs are being

1 made to have the Inspector-General and the Inspectors
2 of the Military Administration gradually replaced by
3 Civil Service Officials.

4

5 "(5) He inquired as to the scope of the
6 Greater East Asia Sphere. Prime Minister TOJO re-
7 plied that it will include the KWANTUNG PROVINCE, SOUTH
8 SEA ISLAND GROUP, MANCHURIA, CHINA, SIAM, FRENCH INDO-
9 CHINA, and the newly occupied areas brought about by
10 the Greater East Asia War. Consequently, with the in-
11 crease of occupied areas, its sphere will be enlarged;
12 thus each gave their reply.

13 "Then following from Committee Member FUTAGAMI:

14

15 "(Recess from 12.10 p.m. to 1.30 p.m.)

16 "(3) He queried as to the purport in special-
17 ly providing a provision (Article No. 19) for concert
18 and cooperation in the Greater East Asia Ministry
19 Legislation. Chief of Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA
20 replied that although the military administration zones
21 within the Greater East Asia Sphere should, as a matter
22 of fact, be dropped from the supervision of the Greater
23 East Asia Minister, it was specially decided to have
24 the Greater East Asia Ministry handle matters connected
25 with administration of occupied zone in order that

1 fruits be borne of unified war and administrative
2 policies and also, in preparation for the time these
3 areas will become free of military administration.

4 "(4) He queried on the matter regarding the
5 appointment of commissioned officers on active service
6 to civil service posts in the Greater East Asia
7 /Ministry/ as stipulated in the separate plan, and the
8 reason for having superb commissioned officers to
9 handle civil service matters in time of war. Prime
10 Minister TOJO replied that since military administra-
11 tion is now effected in Southern Occupied Areas and
12 that in view of the fact ~~that~~ the actual state of af-
13 fairs in CHINA also require serious views in the
14 maintenance of public security, it necessitates the
15 civil service officials of the Greater East Asia
16 Ministry to have thorough knowledge and experience in
17 regard to the Army and Navy.

18

19 "From Committee Member OBATA:
20

21 "He asked whether there is any fear in the
22 establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry caus-
23 ing injury to the prestige of independent nations in
24 the Greater East Asia Sphere, and eventually causing
25 weakening in the mental and material cooperation as
requested by our Empire; and on the other hand,

1 availing enemy powers to commit malevolent propagandas.
2 Premier TOJO replied that military operations during
3 the early stages of the Greater East Asia War have, as
4 a whole, made favourable progress and nearly all the
5 strategical key points in East Asia have been occupied.
6 But the question of vital importance at present is in
7 the construction of a Greater East Asia with these
8 points as its foundation. The future operations of
9 enemy countries will be a demonstration of their ma-
10 terialistic power in the highest degree and, counter-
11 attacks will be made by them from footholds now remain-
12 ing in their hands. It could be deemed that the aspect
13 of war, hereafter, shall display a much intensified
14 situation. Therefore, it is urgently necessary that
15 plans be made for the construction of Greater East Asia
16 by a single effort at this moment, utilizing the ad-
17 vantage, when the enemies have not yet begun their
18 counter-attacks; and thus provide for the winning of
19 victory which is the first requisite today. For this
20 matter, adjustment for the necessary organization shall
21 be made with this plan. Furthermore, the influence
22 affecting a third power belongs to the problem of
23 secondary significance and does not become a reason
24 for hesitating the construction of the Greater East
25 Asia. Suppose it did give rise to misunderstanding

1 among the various countries in the East Asia Sphere,
2 a proper employment of the new organization would,
3 eventually, give understanding to the various coun-
4 tries in the East Asia Sphere that the construction of
5 East Asia would be to their own advantage."
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1 "(3) The nations of the world will be
2 divided into two groups; of which the state affairs
3 of one group will be handled not by the Foreign
4 Office but by the Greater East Asia Ministry. The
5 question was asked whether there would not be con-
6 sternation that the countries under this category
7 would treat Japan as a colonization ministry.

8 "Foreign Minister TANI replied that Japan
9 has special diplomatic relations with the various
10 independent countries in the Greater East Asia
11 Sphere. Since internal guidance of their diplomacy
12 is also being conducted, there is no need of appre-
13 hension. It is similar to the special agreement
14 existing between French Indo-China and France.
15 Since France respects the intentions of Japan re-
16 garding French Indo-China, actually it is impossible
17 to believe that French Indo-China will deal with Japan
18 as a colonization ministry. On the part of Japan,
19 the French ambassador has conferred with the Foreign
20 Minister concerning the local problems of French
21 Indo-China, but no objections were made. Replies
22 to this effect were respectively made.
23

24 "Committee Member TAKEGOE stated that when
25 Japan holds East Asia in its power as in the present,
there is no necessity in establishing the Greater

1 East Asia Ministry which will only help to raise
2 a problem. Furthermore, in order to make the
3 Southern Occupied Areas constructive, it is better
4 to change the military government immediately to
5 civil government.

6 "In asking the opinions of the respective
7 authorities, Premier TOJO replied that since deter-
8 mining the essence for the construction of East
9 Asia and conceiving a unified policy are pressing
10 necessities of the moment, the unification of var-
11 ious organs to arrange for a new organization
12 requires immediate attention. Regarding the question
13 of changing the military government to civil govern-
14 ment, the reply was that it will be immediately
15 carried out, even before the war is concluded,
16 when peace and order is established and when the
17 situation is normal."

18 We turn to the top of page 8. I will
19 read four lines:

20 "The Third Meeting of the Investigation
21 Committee regarding Establishment of the Greater East
22 Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

23 "Meeting held on 14 October 1942 (Wednesday)
24 at Privy Council Office."
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We will only read the names of the accused

1 who attended: "Councillor MINAMI (Jiro); Prime
2 Minister concurrently War Minister TOJO; Chief
3 Secretary of Cabinet HOSHINO; and President of
4 Planning Board SUZUKI."

5 We turn to the top of page 9:

6 "Committee Member IZAWA asked: * * *

7 "(2) Committee IZAWA pointed out the fact
8 that in Formosa, only few native Formosans were
9 being accepted as government and municipal officials.
10 He then asked how can one expect to assimilate
11 the different peoples of the Greater East Asia
12 Sphere in order to bring about the sound establish-
13 ment of Greater East Asia when even in quasi-
14 homeland Formosa, such discrimination exists.

15 "TOJO replied that the establishment of
16 Greater East Asia is based on the spirit of Hakko Iu
17 (T.N. Gathering the eight corners of the world
18 under one roof) and that it would not be difficult
19 to assimilate even the different peoples if dealt
20 with this spirit. /TOJO continued/ that subjects
21 of territories should not purposely be excluded
22 from being appointed as government and municipal
23 officials and that it should gradually be reformed
24 in accordance with the aforementioned spirit."

25 We turn to the top of page 10. I will read

1 four lines:

2 "The Fourth Meeting of the Investigation
3 Committee concerning the Establishment of the
4 Greater East Asia Ministry and eight other items.

5 "Meeting held on 15 October 1942 (Thursday)
6 at Privy Council Office."

7 We will only read the names of those who
8 are now accused who are in attendance: "Councillor
9 MINAMI (Jiro); President of the Planning Board
10 SUZUKI."

11 We turn to the top of page 11:

12 "(Meeting called to order 1:30 p.m.)

13 "SUZUKI, Chairman of the Committee, called
14 the meeting to order. Matters concerning the es-
15 tablishment of Greater East Asia Ministry and the
16 revision of some general rules of other ministries
17 were presented before the Committee.

18 "MORIYAMA, Chief of the Legislation Bureau,
19 roughly explained the aforementioned two subjects.

20 "Committee Member MINAMI (Hiroshi) inquired:
21 Are there any intentions to change the name of
22 Greater East Asia Ministry? Since the distinction
23 between customary diplomacy and extranormal diplomacy
24 is vague, is it not preferable to consider the rela-
25 tions with other countries and not use the word

1 customary diplomacy officially but to dispose of it
2 in actual practice?

3 "Minister of State SUZUKI replied that
4 he considered the name Greater East Asia Ministry
5 proper because the name bespoke straightforwardly
6 the consistency of establishing Greater East Asia
7 and that he had no intention to change it. Chief
8 of Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA /added/ that since
9 the jurisdiction of the Greater East Asia Minister
10 consisted in the performance of administration
11 duties in various fields, it would not be proper
12 to exclude customary diplomacy in practice.

13 "(2) /Committee Member MINAMI (Hiroshi)
14 /inquired why was it necessary to have the Greater
15 East Asia Minister supervise the extranormal diplom-
16 acy with countries within the Greater East Asia
17 region.

18 "Chief of Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA
19 replied that countries in the Greater East Asia
20 Sphere are mutually in a family relationship. There-
21 fore, the diplomacy between these countries and the
22 diplomacy between other independent countries differ
23 in character markedly. Moreover, since there is an
24 intimate and inseparable relationship between for-
25 eign policies and /extranormal diplomacy/ in the

1 Greater East Asia area, it was decided to leave
2 the Greater East Asia Minister take charge."

3 We turn to the top of page 12.
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1 "The Fifth Meeting of the Investigation
2 Committee Concerning the Establishment of the Greater
3 East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

4 "The meeting was held at the Privy Council
5 office on 19 October (Monday), 1942."

6 This meeting was attended by only one of the
7 Accused, Councillor MINAMI.

8 We continue reading at the second line from
9 the bottom of this page:

10 "(Meeting convenes at 10:10 A.M.)

11 "Chairman SUZUKI announced opening of the
12 Meeting.

13 "Committee member FUTAGAMI states: (1)

14 The overseas organs of the Greater East Asia Ministry
15 are officially under the command of the Foreign Minister
16 concerning matters of customary diplomacy; and under
17 the command of the Greater East Asia Minister on those
18 of extranormal diplomacy. Furthermore, since the
19 distinction between customary and extranormal diplomacy
20 is not clear, they /overseas organs/ receive orders
21 separately from the both ministers of the central
22 government on the same issue. He asked whether or not
23 there is fear of this giving cause to bewilderment so
24 that they would not be able to act properly. Foreign
25 Minister TANI replied that the relations of our Empire

1 with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere
2 are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is
3 the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened
4 and developed into the relations of a single large
5 family, and that during this period it could be eventually
6 led to a point where diplomacy would not be needed any
7 more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect
8 of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is
9 necessary that customary diplomacy be continued.
10 Within this extent will the overseas organs come under
11 the superintendence of the Foreign Minister.

12 "(1) Committee member MITSUCHI asked the
13 reason why it was inappropriate to have extranormal
14 diplomacy come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign
15 Office, and customary diplomacy under the Greater East
16 Asia Ministry, respectively, in regard to our foreign
17 relations with the independent countries in the
18 Greater East Asia Sphere.

19 "Foreign Minister TANI and the Chief of the
20 Legislative Bureau NORIYAMA replied that the Greater
21 East Asia Ministry, after all, assumes charge of affairs
22 on the establishment of the Greater East Asia, and since
23 its contents cover the various fields in politics,
24 economy and culture, extending over the whole area of
25 Greater East Asia, it is necessary to have all the

1 various items of diplomatic policy toward independent
2 nations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere be charged to the
3 care of Greater East Asia Ministry. Moreover, it would
4 be appropriate to have international courtesies and
5 conclusion of international treaties, etc., which are
6 customary diplomacy, be charged to the care of the
7 Foreign Ministry."

8 We now turn to the top of page 15.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde, what is the purpose
10 of reading all this? This is now October 1942. Do
11 you submit that what you are reading is evidence of
12 aggression, that even at that hour it discloses the
13 purpose of the war was not self-defense by the Japanese,
14 but some aggressive design? To what issue is it
15 relevant except that of aggressive war? It has no
16 bearing on conventional war crimes or on crimes against
17 humanity, certainly. The only thing left are crimes
18 against peace. The peace was broken twelve months
19 before. The purpose, if it has any purpose -- I do
20 not know whether you are clear in your own mind about
21 it -- must be to show that Japan entered the war not to
22 defend herself, but in order to build up this vast empire.

23 MR. HYDE: Your last statement, your Honor,
24 is exactly our position. That is the purpose of this.
25 It shows what they were going to do --the question of

1 aggressive war, conquest, domination. They are
2 showing their intentions.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well then, does it require all
4 this elaboration and reiteration? Isn't it all
5 cumulative?

6 MR. HYDE: Yes, it is cumulative, but it
7 also discloses the names of the accused who from
8 time to time participated in formulating these plans
9 and the policy that was pursued.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Very few of the accused whose
11 names you read made any contribution to those debates.
12 TOJO did.

13 MR. HYDE: Your Honor, it is sometimes
14 difficult to know just how much evidence a court
15 might require. This I admit is cumulative.

16 THE PRESIDENT: You could mention the names
17 of those accused as taking part in that Greater
18 East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

19 MR. BROOKS: I would like to object to such
20 procedure unless the Court defines what it means by
21 "taking part," so that we have some idea of the defense
22 to establish in that case under the charges in that
23 Indictment.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I will clarify that for you --
25 "taking part in aggression."

1 aggressive war, conquest, domination. They are
2 showing their intentions.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well then, does it require all
4 this elaboration and reiteration? Isn't it all
5 cumulative?

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7 also discloses the names of the accused who from
8 time to time participated in formulating these plans
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11 names you read made any contribution to those debates.
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17 of those accused as taking part in that Greater
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20 procedure unless the Court defines what it means by
21 "taking part," so that we have some idea of the defense
22 to establish in that case under the charges in that
23 Indictment.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I will clarify that for you --
25 "taking part in aggression."

1 We will adjourn for fifteen minutes.

2 (Whereupon, at 1445 a recess was
3 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
4 were resumed as follows):
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Goldberg & Spratt

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, may I make just
5 a further observation with respect to the question
6 you raised before we recessed?

7 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

8 MR. HYDE: As you have stated, Mr. President,
9 this part of our proof deals with aggression. We are
10 dealing primarily with class A crimes; B and C are
11 involved only in so far as there might be some over-
12 lapping. Our purpose is to show that this was a
13 war of aggression and conquest and domination.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Crimes against peace is the
15 best term to use.

16 MR. HYDE: We think -- the execution of their
17 plans, we think, is the best way to show what they in-
18 tended to do.

19 THE PRESIDENT: So we thought, but the
20 question is whether you have not already given suf-
21 ficient evidence of this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
22 Sphere and what it involved. It is material to know
23 who among the accused, if any of them, took part in
24 that operation from time to time. That is to say,
25 who supported it. But you have gone far beyond that.

1 However, we have to rely on your judgment to some
2 extent. We are only concerned that you keep the real
3 issue in mind and watch the evidence you are tendering.

4 MR. HYDE: If I have the Tribunal's permis-
5 sion, I should like to point out the dates of the
6 remaining meetings in the documents from which I have
7 been reading, and indicate in addition thereto the names
8 of the accused who were present, and that would be all.

9 THE PRESIDENT: You might include any impor-
10 tant speeches. We do not want to shut those out.

11 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, I was going to
12 object unless it was shown the extent they participated
13 or influenced the decision; that their mere presence
14 alone would not be enough, I didn't think.

15 THE PRESIDENT: You should give the decision.
16 You know most of them have been unanimous. I do not
17 recollect any dissent.

18 MR. HYDE: May I indicate the meetings and
19 those present?

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

21 MR. HYDE: On page 15 of the document, the
22 minutes for the meeting held on the 20th of October,
23 1942, are commenced. At that meeting the following
24 of the accused were present: Jiro MINAMI; Navy
25 Minister SHIMADA; Chief of Naval Affairs, Navy Minister

OKA.

1 Now turning to page 17 of the document,
2 where we find that the seventh meeting of the com-
3 mittee was held on the 20th of October, 1942 --

4 THE PRESIDENT: If these were just dis-
5 cussions leading to no decision, and none of the
6 accused took part in the discussions, what bearing
7 have they? I am referring to the last two meetings.

8 MR. HYDE: Yes, sir.

9 THE PRESIDENT: The accused TOJO took part
10 in the earlier meetings. You see, all this may be
11 interesting, but if it is not relevant or material
12 we cannot consider it.

13 MR. HYDE: With respect to the meeting on
14 the 20th of October, 1942, the minutes of which start
15 on page 17 of the document, we find that Councillor
16 MINAMI, Jiro, Navy Minister SHIMADA, and Chief of
17 Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry OKA were present.

18 I would like to read from page 19, starting
19 with the third paragraph from the end, and read two
20 paragraphs:

21 "Committee Chief SUZUKI stated to the effect
22 that this draft is not based upon the rules of right-
23 eousness but on the rules of might, and for the reason
24 that it would be unsatisfactory as a far-sighted
25

1 national plan, if there is unity of opinion in the
2 committee, he could assume the responsibility of
3 the negotiations and in all frankness, endeavor to
4 have the government listen to this, but if there is
5 lack of complete unity in the committee, it would be
6 difficult to accept this responsibility.

7 "In connection with this, Committee members
8 ISHII, USHIO, and IKEDA said to the effect that even
9 though there was a lack of unity in the committee,
10 it would be advisable to have the Committee Chief
11 take the trouble of negotiating with the government
12 and requesting its consideration if there existed a
13 majority opinion. To this, Committee member IZAWA
14 concurred."

15 THE PRESIDENT: SUZUKI is not an accused,
16 is he?

17 MR. HYDE: No, your Honor.

18 And now the last meeting on page 20 of the
19 document, the eighth meeting held on the 21st of Octo-
20 ber, 1942, at this meeting the following accused
21 were present: MINAMI, Jiro, Prime Minister TOJO,
22 Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs OKA.

23 I will read the last paragraph on page 21:

24 "Chairman SUZUKI proceeded to give an account
25 of his interview with Prime Minister TOJO concerning

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1 the negotiations for the amendment of the original
2 proposal agreed upon at the previous Committee
3 meeting. He said that the Prime Minister was
4 firmly determined to adhere to the original proposal,
5 and could under no circumstances agree to the amend-
6 ment, and that the Committee, therefore, had no
7 choice but to express its views frankly when re-
8 porting the results of the investigation. All com-
9 mitteemen expressed thanks to the chairman and de-
10 cided to drop the problem."

11 At this point we respectfully invite the
12 Tribunal's attention to exhibit 90, Imperial Ordinance 707, dated 1 November 1942, providing for the
13 organization of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic
14 Affairs, of which the relative articles were read on
15 9 September 1946, at page 5186 of the record.

17 The prosecution now offers in evidence
18 document 2339, an excerpt from the Japan Year Book
19 1943-44, exhibit 1324 for identification. This
20 document contains part of the speech of Prime Minister
21 TOJO in the Japanese Diet on 15 June 1943, expressing
22 the Japanese Government's announced policy with regard
23 to the East Indies.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1 No. 2339-B will receive exhibit No. 1345.

2 (Whereupon, the document above re-
3 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
4 No. 1345 and received in evidence.)

5 MR. HYDE: We will now read exhibit 1345:

6 "The Japan Year Book 1943-44 Pages 200 and
7 202.

8 "The 82nd Session of the Diet.

9 "On June 16 a three-day extraordinary
10 session of the Diet was convened to approve a number
11 of official measures designed to intensify the prose-
12 cution of hostilities on a far more effective total
13 war footing than hitherto. This was the 82 session
14 of the Diet which, displaying a remarkable speed,
15 transacted the entire scheduled business and resolved
16 to exert its utmost to enhance further the fighting
17 potentiality of the nation. Premier General Hideki
18 TOJO, speaking on the opening day of the Diet, made
19 a seven-point declaration. He affirmed that the de-
20 fense preparations of greater East Asia had been
21 strengthened appreciably, and that Nippon was making
22 all arrangements to launch decisive operations. Ex-
23 plaining that the relations with the Nanking Govern-
24 ment had become strikingly smooth and close, he
25 declared for the first time that independence would

1 be granted to the Philippines within this year.

2 "The gist of the Premier's speech follows:

3 "The populations in Malai, Sumatra, Djawa,
4 Borneo, Celebes and other places under Nipponese
5 military administrations are assiduously attending
6 their cooperation toward Nippon. Even in the midst
7 of war, they have been liberated and accorded educa-
8 tional and cultural blessings under the sympathetic
9 guidance of the Nipponese authorities, so that they
10 are now enjoying a life of hope and happiness never
11 experienced in the past. It is, I believe, a matter
12 of hearty congratulation for the Indonesian people.

13 "It is our intention to go further and, in
14 pursuance of the aspirations of the natives, to take
15 measures step by step envisaging the participation
16 of the native populations in government to the extent
17 commensurate with the degree of their ability in the
18 course of the year. In particular, we intend to realize
19 this state of affairs as early as possible in Djawa in
20 view of the advanced conditions of the island and in
21 response to the desire of the people there."

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that speech does not
23 add very great weight to the prosecution's case.

24 MR. HYDE: It may have some bearing when
25 the witness that will be called later gives his testimony.

1 MR. HYDE: We offer in evidence prosecution
2 document 2339-C, an excerpt from the Japan Year Book
3 1943-44, exhibit 1324 for identification. This excerpt
4 is to be found on pages 1049 to 1051, and contains the
5 joint declaration of the Assembly of Greater East
6 Asiatic Nations, adopted on 6 November 1943, as well
7 as an account of the proceedings of the said Assembly
8 on 5 and 6 November 1943.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
11 No. 2339-C will receive exhibit No. 1346.

12 (Whereupon, the document above referred to
13 was marked exhibit No. 1346, and was received
14 in evidence.)

15 MR. HYDE: I will read a part of the exhibit
16 just referred to, starting at the top of page 1

17 "The Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations
18 Joint Declaration Adopted on November 6, 1943.

19 "It is the basic principle for the establish-
20 ment of world peace that the nations of the world have
21 each its proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common
22 through mutual aid and assistance.

23 "The United States of America and the British
24 Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed
25 other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia, they

1 indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation,
2 and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of
3 enslaving the entire region, and finally they came
4 to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein
5 lies the cause of the present war.

6 "The countries of Greater East Asia, with a
7 view to contributing to the cause of world peace,
8 undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of
9 Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liber-
10 ating their region from the yoke of British-American
11 domination, and assuring their self-existence and self-
12 defense, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in
13 accordance with the following principles:

14 "1. The countries of Greater East Asia through
15 mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their
16 region and construct an order of common prosperity
17 and well-being based upon justice.

18 "2. The countries of Greater East Asia will
19 ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by
20 respecting one another's sovereignty and independence
21 and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

22 "3. The countries of Greater East Asia by
23 respecting one another's traditions and developing
24 the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the
25 culture and civilization of Greater East Asia."

1 "4. The countries of Greater East Asia will
2 endeavor to accelerate their economic development
3 through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity
4 and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their
5 region.

6 "5. The countries of Greater East Asia will
7 cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of
8 the world, and work for the abolition of racial discrim-
9 inations, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the
10 opening of resources throughout the world, and contri-
11 bute thereby to the progress of mankind.

12 "The Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations
13 was officially opened at 10 a.m. on November 5, 1943
14 in Tokyo. Attending this great conclave of nations
15 were the Representatives of the six independent nations
16 of Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines,
17 and Burma. Also present was Subhas Chandra Bose, Head
18 of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, as Observer.

19 "Representing the united will of the one bil-
20 lion people of East Asia, the 46 Representatives,
21 Associates, and Observers arrived at the scheduled
22 time on the morning of November 5 and entered the ante-
23 chamber of the imposing Imperial Diet Building, ex-
24 changing cordial greetings with each other."

25 Turning to the bottom of page 2, the last

1 paragraph:

2 "The second day session began at 10 a.m.
3 November 6, in the same chamber, attended by all the
4 representatives, associates and observers. It began
5 with a proposal being made by Prime Minister General
6 TOJO, the Japanese Representative. After an earnest
7 exchange of opinions among the Representatives, a
8 recess was called at 11:50 a.m.

9 "Joint Declaration Approved. With the recess
10 being ended at 0:40 p.m. Prime Minister General TOJO
11 rose at 0:45 p.m. and reread to the Assembly the draft
12 of the Joint Declaration, which was welcomed with great
13 applause. He then asked the Representatives to stand
14 if they approved the draft, to which request the Repre-
15 sentatives of the six nations stood up as one man, ac-
16 companied by surging waves of thunderous applause. The
17 time was 0:55 p.m."

18 I turn to the last page, the third line from
19 the top:

20 "The names of the representatives, associates
21 and observers are as follows:" And from the list I
22 will read the names of the accused who were present.

23 "His Excellency General Hideki TOJO Prime
24 Minister.

25 "His Excellency Admiral Shigetarō SHIMADA,

1 Minister of the Navy,

2 "His Excellency Mr. Mamoru SHIGEMITSU, Minister
3 of Foreign Affairs

4 "His Excellency Mr. Naoki HOSHINO, Chief
5 Secretary of the Cabinet

6 "His Excellency Major-General Kenryo SATO,
7 Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Ministry
8 of the Army

9 "His Excellency Vice-Admiral Takezumi OKA,
10 Director of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Ministry
11 of the Navy."
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1 We offer for identification only prosecution
2 document No. 468, being a volume of speeches made be-
3 fore the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations by
4 the representatives of the various countries.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 468 will receive exhibit No. 1347 for identifica-
7 tion only.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 (Whereupon, the document above-
10 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1347 for identification only.)

12 MR. HYDE: We offer in evidence prosecution
13 document No. 468-A, an excerpt from the aforementioned
14 document, being an address of His Excellency General
15 Hideki TOJO, Representative of Japan, on 5 November
16 1943.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
19 No. 468-A will receive exhibit No. 1347-A.

20 (Whereupon, the document above re-
21 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 1347-A and received in evidence.)

23 MR. HYDE: I will read just a part of this
24 document, starting on page 1:

25 "ADDRESS OF HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL HIDEKI

1 TOJO, REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN.

2 "November 5, 1943.

3 "As the representative of the sponsor nation,
4 I have the privilege to extend to you the sincere
5 greetings of the Japanese Government and to make
6 a statement of their views."

7 I turn to page 3, the second paragraph:

8 "It is my belief that for all the peoples
9 of Greater East Asia the present war is a decisive
10 struggle upon whose outcome depends their rise or
11 fall. It is only by winning through this war that
12 they may ensure forever their existence in their
13 Greater East-Asian home and enjoy common prosperity
14 and happiness. Indeed, a successful conclusion of
15 this war means the completion of the very task of con-
16 structing the new order of Greater East Asia."

17 Now, I go to the bottom of page 3, next to
18 the last paragraph:

19 "It is my belief that to enable all nations
20 each to have its proper place and to enjoy the blessings
21 of common prosperity by mutual efforts and mutual help
22 is the fundamental condition for the establishment of
23 world peace. And I must furthermore say, that to
24 practice mutual help among closely related nations in
25 one region, fostering one another's national growth

1 and establishing a relationship of common prosperity
2 and well-being, and, at the same time, to cultivate
3 relations of harmony and concord with nations of
4 other regions is the most effective and the most
5 practical method of securing world peace."

6 I will read the next three paragraphs only:

7 "It is an incontrovertible fact that the
8 nations of Greater East Asia are bound, in every
9 respect, by ties of an inseparable relationship.
10 I firmly believe that such being the case, it is
11 their common mission to secure the stability of
12 Greater East Asia and to construct a new order of
13 common prosperity and well-being.

14 "This new order of Greater East Asia is to
15 rest upon the spirit of justice which is inherent in
16 Greater East Asia. In this respect it is funda-
17 mentally different from the old order designed to serve
18 the interests of the United States and Britain who do
19 not hesitate to practice injustice, deception and
20 exploitation in order to promote their own prosperity.

21 "The nations of Greater East Asia, while
22 mutually recognizing their ~~autonomy~~ autonomy and independence,
23 must, as a whole, establish among themselves relations
24 of brotherly amity. Such relations cannot be created
25 if one country should utilize another as a means to

1 an end. I believe that they come into being only
2 when there is mutual respect for one another's au-
3 tonomy and independence, then one prospers through
4 another's prosperity and all countries give expression
5 to their true selves."
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1 Continuing with document 2754, exhibit 1344,
2 commencing at the top of page 2:

3 "At the time of this decision Prime Minister
4 TOJO was rather in favour of independence and the
5 Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the
6 Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as
7 mentioned above; while others again, took the stand
8 that once independence was granted, Japan, for the
9 sake of her personal honour would have to respect the
10 independence to the last, and would be in a difficult
11 position when negotiations, peace, etc., came one day
12 to be considered, and that for this reason the status
13 quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation
14 was thus finally decided on.

15 "2. Though the Japanese Army authorities
16 on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this deci-
17 sion, they made no representations of their oppo-
18 sition. Mr. Soekarno, who visited Japan soon after
19 the Greater East Asia Conference, made an earnest
20 request to Prime Minister TOJO to grant the East
21 Indies area her independence. The meeting, however,
22 ended without any definite reply from TOJO and Soekarno
23 returned to Java greatly disappointed."

24 We now offer in evidence -- if the Court
25 please, I will read a little more before I offer this

1 next document.

2 "Later, HAYASHI, Chief of the Justice
3 Administration, who was then Supreme Councillor
4 for the Military Administration in Java, came to
5 Tokyo, by approval of the Supreme Commander of the
6 Japanese Army on the spot, with the problem of inde-
7 pendence for the East Indies, and did his utmost
8 to get it accepted by the circles concerned. Foreign
9 Minister SHIGEMITSU supported the proposal and made
10 efforts for the alteration of the decision mentioned
11 above. With the formation of the KOISO Cabinet,
12 the arguments for independence gradually began to
13 carry more weight.
14

15 "For instance, at the first War Super-
16 vision Conference of the KOISO Cabinet, it was
17 decided, in an article of "The Policies to be Taken
18 in the Future for the Supervision of the War", that
19 a statement concerning independence for the East
20 Indies should be declared at the next Diet Session.
21 As for the circumstances which had led to this de-
22 cision, the Mariana defense line on the Pacific
23 front had been broken and the United States was
24 rapidly turning to the offensive. The situation
25 was such that the new Cabinet had to take some new
measures for uniting Greater East Asia, and it was

1 only natural that the Foreign Ministry should insist
2 upon the plan for independence. The central authori-
3 ties of the army now also inclined to approve of
4 this plan in compliance to the requests from the
5 Army authorities on the spot, for the reason that
6 racial consciousness had been so noticeably enhanced
7 in Java and Sumatra, the areas under Army Military
8 Administration, that thanks to leaving the problem
9 of independence so vague, it was gradually becoming
10 difficult to secure the cooperation of the native
11 inhabitants.
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13 "The naval authorities, however, still
14 maintained such strong opposition, that the pro-
15 motion of the independence policy was entirely
16 deferred as far as the areas under the Navy's Mil-
17 itary Administration were concerned,"
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"1. It shall be announced in a special

1 Diet session that the East Indies shall be made
2 independent in the future.

3 "2. The former Netherlands Indies (ex-
4 cluding New Guinea) shall be the scheduled terri-
5 tory to be made independent. (The Navy's approval
6 reserved).

7 "3. The Form of Independence and the
8 relations with the Empire shall be determined
9 separately. However, steps shall be taken so that
10 the Empire's requests shall be fully attained.

11 "4. The Time of Independence shall be
12 determined separately by taking into account the
13 condition of progress in the political ability of
14 the people, but a too premature enforcement of
15 Independence shall be avoided. Moreover, the
16 question as to whether the entire territory shall
17 be made independent at the same time or be made
18 independent by degrees shall be decided upon accord-
19 ing to the conditions at the time.

20 "5. In Java measures shall be taken in
21 accordance with the following, while respecting
22 the initiative of the people:

23 "a. In conformity with the Declaration
24 of the Imperial Government, efforts
25 shall be made promptly towards the

1 consistency of the purport of same.

2 "b. Radical changes in the present status
3 of the military administration shall
4 be avoided, but the participation in
5 politics by the people shall be still
6 further strengthened and expanded, and
7 they shall be given political train-
8 ing.

9 "c. To recognize as speedily as possible
10 the investigating and studying by the
11 inhabitants on the spot of matters
12 necessary for Independence.

13 "d. The Indonesian songs and the use of
14 Indonesian flags, hitherto prohibited,
15 shall be permitted.

16 "6. As for the various other territories,
17 measures corresponding to the foregoing Paragraph
18 shall be adopted as far as possible so as to con-
19 form to their respective actual conditions."
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1 We continue again the reading of exhibit 1344,
2 at page 3, paragraph 2:

3 "For this reason, no definite policy was
4 decided in regard to independence, except that Prime
5 Minister KOISO merely made a statement at the Diet
6 Session to the effect that the independence for the
7 East Indies area would be encouraged in the future.
8 (Annex II)."

9 Annex No. II is already in evidence as part
10 of exhibit 277, the speech of Premier KOISO before
11 the 85th Diet Session on 7 September 1944. With the
12 Tribunal's permission we would like to read one para-
13 graph therefrom, starting at the bottom of page 6 of
14 the English text.

15 "As to the East Indies, Japan permitted the
16 inhabitants to participate in politics according to
17 their wish. The inhabitants throughout the East Indies
18 have continuously endeavored to carry out the Greater
19 East Asia War, recognizing the real intention of Japan.
20 They have also been cooperating remarkably with the
21 military government there. In view of these facts
22 we declare here that we intend to recognize their
23 independence in the future in order to ensure the eter-
24 nal happiness of the East Indian race. In this way
25 the Japanese government intends to continue with her

1 former policy toward Greater East Asia and by develop-
2 ing strongly the spirit of the Greater East Asia Joint
3 Declaration, she expects to live up to the trust of
4 the nations of Greater East Asia. Thus, if Greater
5 East Asia, with Japan as its center and under the firm
6 belief of victory, further increases its solidarity,
7 concentrates its forces both spiritually and materially,
8 and prosecutes ardently the 'Holy War', which aims at
9 the reconstruction of Greater East Asia, we firmly
10 believe that we can destroy the ambitions of America
11 and England and can express our ideals concerning the
12 world forever."

13 "We continue again with the reading of exhibit
14 1344, starting at paragraph 3 on page 3.

15 "3. Subsequently, the war situation took a
16 turn for the worse and sea-transportation between Japan
17 and the South was definitely at an end. For this
18 reason, demands for economic self-sufficiency by the
19 troops on the spot were greatly increased, and it became
20 notably difficult to win the hearts of the native
21 inhabitants of Java and Sumatra by mere abstract state-
22 ments about independence.

23 "The Army authorities on the spot had pre-
24 viously established a Central Advisory Council in Java,
25 in accordance with the policy of political participation

1 for the native inhabitants, but this was no more than
2 a consultative body for political administration. The
3 deciding of a definite policy for the preparation
4 of independence thus became an imminent problem.

5 "The Navy, on the other hand, no longer had
6 any further reason to adhere to its past opposition
7 views, as the abandonment of the South had already
8 been taking place since the fall of the Philippines.

9 "Since the beginning of 1945, the opinions
10 of the Army and the Navy had become uniform over the
11 problem of independence for the East Indies, and other
12 matters.

13 "Consequently, after the following discussion
14 was held by the authorities concerned of the three
15 Ministries at the Supreme Advisory Conference of
16 July 17th, it was decided that, 'The Empire shall
17 recognize the independence of the East Indies at the
18 earliest possible opportunity. For this purpose,
19 preparations for independence shall be immediately
20 promoted and intensified.' (Annex III) and (Annex IV).

21 "Less than a month later the Empire had sur-
22 rendered and this was never put into effect."
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1 We now offer in evidence Annex 3, just
2 mentioned, which is prosecution document 2758, en-
3 titled "Measures for the Netherlands East Indies
4 Independence; Date for Foreign Minister's Explana-
5 tion, 17 July, 1945.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
7 terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
9 ment No. 2758 will receive exhibit No. 1349.

10 (Whereupon, the document referred
11 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
12 1349 and received in evidence.)

13 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit 1349.

14 (Reading)

15 "Measures for the N.E.I. Independence"
16 "Date for Foreign Minister's Explanation,
17 17 July, 1945.

18 "1. In the East Indies, there have been
19 fierce Independence movements ever since the time of
20 the Dutch occupation. 'Indonesian for the Indonesians'
21 was the earnest desire of the separatists. As soon as
22 our Army occupied the East Indies after the outbreak of
23 the Greater East Asia War, the above pioneers all
24 rendered whole hearted cooperation to us in the expect-
25 ation that the golden opportunity for Independence had

1 offered itself. They have achieved successful results
2 in their activities as members of the Chuo Sangi-In
3 (Central Advisory Council) and as officials or members
4 of local administrative organizations. On the other
5 hand, the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was
6 issued in November of the year before last clarifying
7 the Empire's great policy to respect the Independence
8 of every country in Greater East Asia. Simultaneously,
9 with the establishment of Independence in Burma and
10 the Philippines and of the Free India Temporary Gov-
11 ernment, the desire of the leaders of Independence
12 Movements in the East Indies also was greatly encour-
13 aged.

14 "The Empire, on her part, regarded it proper
15 to carry through the spirit of the Greater East Asia
16 Declaration and to make some kind of gesture in regard
17 to the problem of Independence for the East Indies as
18 a reward for the cooperation and expectation of the
19 native inhabitants.

20 "Accordingly, after deliberation at the
21 Supreme War Supervisory Conference of Sept. 5th, last
22 year, former Prime Minister KOISO, in his declaration
23 of the government's policies at the 85th Extraordinary
24 Session of the Diet on Sept. 9th, made a statement that
25 'The Empire is ready to recognize Independence for the

1 East Indies in order to secure everlasting welfare
2 for her people', thereby clarifying the Empire's
3 intentions on this problem.

4 "Of course, at the Supreme War Supervisory
5 Conference of Sept. 5th, it was merely decided that
6 the above statement was to be made at the Diet Session;
7 and in regard to the areas to which Independence was to
8 be granted, there was no question to Java and Sumatra,
9 but nothing definite was decided on the rest of the
10 areas. Only it was decided to permit the use of the
11 Indonesian song and the Indonesian flag which had
12 heretofore been prohibited, and to encourage and in-
13 crease the participation in politics by inhabitants
14 to give the native inhabitants a chance to investigate
15 and study matters necessary for the Independence.

16 "II In response to the above statement by
17 the Imperial Government, an Independence Investigation
18 Committee was established in Java; while in Sumatra
19 and Celebes also, measures had been taken to encourage
20 participation in politics by native inhabitants. Nec-
21 essary preparations had been under way, when in the
22 statement of Sept. 7th, last year, it was merely
23 stated 'her Independence shall be recognized in the
24 future', and no time for it had been indicated. To
25 promise the Indonesians their Independence and have

1 its realization in a state of uncertainty for a
2 long time, will, it is feared, give rise to doubts
3 as to the sincerity of our Empire.

4 "Especially, at this moment when the enemy's
5 counter-offensive is already about to extend to a cor-
6 ner of the East Indies, it will be imminent, from the
7 necessity of seeking a more positive cooperation from
8 the native inhabitants, to further materialize the
9 statement made last year and to decide clearly the
10 time for the Independence and announce it at home and
11 abroad, thereby clarifying the Empire's true intentions
12 towards the complete adjustment of Independence for
13 Greater East Asia.

14 "From this standpoint -- "
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Is it worth while con-
2 tinuing to read this?

3 MR. HYDE: It just indicates what their
4 attitude really was as spoken, and we will later
5 show it to the Court as it was actually carried
6 out. I will refrain from reading the balance of it,
7 your Honor.

8 I would like to put in one more document.

9 We now offer in evidence Annex 4, which
10 is prosecution document 2759, and is entitled,
11 "Decision of the Supreme War Plans Council No.
12 27, July 17, 1945, re Measures for the East Indies
13 Independence."

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
15 terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
17 ment No. 2759 will receive exhibit No. 1350.

18 (Whereupon, the document above
19 referred to was marked prosecution's
20 exhibit No. 1350 and received in evidence.)

21 MR. HYDE: If the Court please, I would
22 like to read this document. This will conclude our
23 documentary evidence before the presentation of our
24 witnesses.

25 From the Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps.

1 Dated September 7, 1944. (Reading:)

2 "We hereby notify you that, based on the
3 Prime Minister's proclamation regarding the grant-
4 ing of the independence of the East-Indies at the
5 85th Special Session of the Diet today, the 7th of
6 September, it is decided that the army will meet
7 the situation properly generally in accordance
8 with the following stipulations:" --

9 THE PRESIDENT: What are you reading
10 from? We haven't that document. We have docu-
11 ment 2759.

12 MR. HYDE: I apologize, your Honor. I am
13 sorry.

14 I will read exhibit 1350, document 2759.
15 (Reading:)

16 "Decision of the Supreme War Plans
17 Council, No. 27, July 17, 1945, re
18 Measures for the East Indies Independence.

19 "I Policy

20 "In order to contribute towards the com-
21 plete prosecution of the Greater East Asia War,
22 the Empire shall recognize as soon as possible the
23 Independence of the East Indies. For this purpose,
24 preparations for the Independence shall be hastened
25 and reinforced immediately."

"II Outline

1 "(1) The area to be made independent shall be
2 the former Netherlands East Indies.

3 "(2) Preparations for the Independence shall be
4 pushed throughout the entire territory and as soon
5 as preparations are completed in the principal
6 areas, the Independence of a new nation shall be
7 proclaimed throughout the entire territory. How-
8 ever, as regards the administration of areas where
9 preparations are not completed, steps will be
10 taken to transfer those areas by degrees under the
11 jurisdiction of the new nation in accordance with
12 the state of the progress of preparations.

13 "For this purpose, an Independence Pre-
14 paratory Committee shall be speedily organized
15 in Java, and be made to prepare various matters
16 necessary in carrying out the Independence."
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1 "(3) The scheduled date of Independence shall
2 be roughly fixed as soon as possible and shall be
3 announced by the Independence Preparatory Committee,
4 together with the areas designated as the domain of
5 the new nation.

6 "(4) The polity, political system, name of
7 the country and the scope of the citizens shall be
8 established by public opinion.

9 "(5) Through the policy concerned with the
10 Independence, efforts shall be made to promote the
11 race-consciousness of the people, and to make them
12 contribute toward the complete prosecution of the war.
13 Measures shall be taken to prevent with all efforts,
14 any hindrance to operations and preparations.

15 "(6) The execution of this policy at the
16 actual place shall be entrusted entirely to the hands
17 of the army there."

18 We call the witness, Major de Weerd.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is not worthwhile
20 swearing this witness in tonight.

21 We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow
22 morning.

23 (Whereupon, at 1555, an adjourn-
24 ment was taken until Friday, 6 December 1946,
25 at 0930.)

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